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Too Many Nevada HOA Protections are a Facade

Writer: Mike Kosor
Mike Kosor
4 minutes ago
13 min read

Nevada's HOA Laws: Will Lawmakers Finally Make Them Work?


How many examples of ineffective homeowner protections must accumulate before lawmakers examine whether something is fundamentally wrong with the system itself- and act?


Over time, Nevada lawmakers have enacted exceptions and special permissions that undermine HOA laws most homeowners would reasonably understand as straightforward protections of their rights and financial interests. They have also failed to correct known loopholes and ambiguities that weaken those protections. These exceptions and shortcomings can have significant financial and governance consequences for homeowners. More fundamentally, their continued existence raises a troubling question: Are Nevada's HOA laws actually providing the protections homeowners have been promised?


It is reasonable to presume lawmakers had legitimate reasons for adopting statutory exceptions. Yet our examination of the available legislative record reveals a troubling pattern: justifications that fail to adequately explain why certain exceptions were necessary, with little evidence that lawmakers ensured meaningful safeguards would remain—or that homeowners could realistically enforce them. Meanwhile, known loopholes and deficiencies have persisted without meaningful correction.


Are homeowners simply expected to accept “politics”—or the influence of those with the greatest access to lawmakers—as sufficient justification for protections that fail to protect them?


How we arrived at this point is open to debate. But this article does not depend on proving lawmakers' motives, nor does it seek to excuse their decisions. Nor do we intend to burden readers with lengthy legal explanations. Those interested in the underlying statutes, legislative history, and supporting evidence will find them in the referenced articles and our extensive collection of earlier posts.


The issue is what Nevada law permits, what homeowners actually experience, and what lawmakers have failed to correct despite years of evidence that protections are not working as promised. More importantly, as Nevada approaches another legislative session, what will lawmakers do about the shortcomings that have been left behind?


Nevada already has the regulatory institutions and decades of experience needed to identify and reevaluate these deficiencies. What is needed now is renewed legislative and regulatory initiative to ensure that homeowner protections work as intended.


How Did We Get Here?

To understand why many homeowner protections continue to fall short, we need to briefly revisit a pivotal decision Nevada lawmakers made more than two decades ago: moving beyond private litigation to establish a system of government oversight and enforcement.


When Nevada adopted its modern HOA laws through AB 221 in 1991, it relied substantially on the Uniform Common Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA), developed by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC) in 1982. Both the UCIOA and Nevada's lawmakers recognized potential conflicts between developers, association directors, and homeowners. The resulting statute, NRS 116, established important homeowner protections. Notably, Nevada went beyond the original UCIOA by expressly imposing fiduciary duty obligations on all association directors and officers—not merely those appointed by the developer.


But the framework enacted retained a fundamental weakness: substantial reliance on private civil litigation to enforce those protections and resolve disputes. The ULC's drafters understood the potential conflicts and included an optional, albeit limited, administrative regulatory framework. Nevada chose not to adopt it.[1]


Whatever the reasons—political compromise, industry influence, or confidence in traditional judicial remedies—the consequences were substantial. Homeowners possessed legal rights yet lacked a suitable structure or resources to reasonably enforce them against associations controlling collective funds, professional management, legal counsel, and much of the information necessary to establish a violation.


The law recognized homeowner rights without adequately ensuring homeowners could exercise them.


Nevada Recognized Its Mistake

Fortunately, Nevada eventually recognized that relying principally on private enforcement was inadequate. Homeowners had become increasingly vocal about the shortcomings of that approach. Some lawmakers listened and began pushing for a change in direction.

The Legislature established the Office of the Ombudsman in 1997. Then, in 2003, Senator Mike Schneider championed SB 100, establishing the Commission for Common-Interest Communities and Condominium Hotels and substantially expanding the State's authority to investigate and adjudicate violations of HOA law.


This was no modest reform. It placed Nevada at the forefront of state HOA oversight and represented a fundamental change in the approach to homeowner protection.


Rather than treating HOAs principally as private contractual arrangements whose disputes belonged in civil courts, Nevada established specialized government oversight and enforcement to address the distinctive governance and accountability problems of common-interest communities.


For the first time, homeowners had a specialized state regulatory process through which violations of HOA law could be investigated and adjudicated, rather than having to rely solely on costly civil litigation. But the Commission's authority remained largely limited to violations of statutes and regulations. Disputes involving governing documents alone remained outside its jurisdiction—an important limitation that continues to warrant reconsideration.


Nevertheless, Nevada had taken a major step toward recognizing that meaningful homeowner protection required more than enacting legal rights and leaving individuals to enforce them at their own expense.


For much of the following decade, the new regulatory framework showed promise. The Commission exercised its regulatory authority, considered improvements to HOA governance, and helped develop additional homeowner protections.


But That Progress Did Not Continue

Lawmakers cannot reasonably be expected to correct problems that are never brought to their attention. That is one reason Nevada established specialized regulatory institutions—not merely to administer existing laws, but to recognize when those laws were failing to accomplish their intended purposes.


The Division and CIC Commission possess experience, information, and authority that individual homeowners generally lack. They are positioned to identify recurring deficiencies, examine their consequences, develop regulations where authorized, and bring matters requiring legislative correction to lawmakers' attention.


Yet many significant problems have persisted for years without meaningful regulatory examination or proposals for correction. The initiative that once distinguished Nevada's regulatory system has substantially diminished.


Our earlier series, Have Nevada's HOA Regulators Abandoned Owners?, examined statutory ambiguities, inconsistent interpretations, and unresolved governance problems that have continued despite repeated requests for regulatory attention. The message was not that Nevada needs another regulatory system, but that the institutions lawmakers already created need to make the existing one work.


Here, we add a broader but closely related problem: statutory exceptions and special permissions that undermine apparent homeowner protections, together with loopholes and deficiencies lawmakers and regulators have allowed to remain unresolved.


Both raise questions about the effectiveness and independence of Nevada's regulatory oversight.


In his 2026 paper, The Developer Control Problem: Applying Corporate Fiduciary Standards to Homeowner Associations, law professor W.C. Bunting examines how organized developer interests can shape HOA legislation while individual homeowners lack comparable resources and influence. He argues that this imbalance has produced legal standards that inadequately protect homeowners against conflicts inherent in developer-controlled associations.


Nevada's regulatory experience raises a related concern. The loss of regulatory momentum favors interests that benefit from limited government oversight, greater discretion in HOA governance, and continue reliance on costly civil litigation to enforce homeowner rights.


Nevada's 2003 reforms were intended to move homeowner protection away from that model. Yet despite its early promise, persistent and well-documented problems remain. The Commission’s retreat from regulatory initiative leaves too many shortcomings unresolved, while those who benefit from limited oversight continued to enjoy its advantages.


Looking Beyond the Appearance of Protection

The examples that follow concern different provisions of Nevada's HOA laws. Each offers what appears to be a meaningful homeowner protection, yet closer examination reveals something quite different.


Some protections are undermined by exceptions lawmakers expressly authorized. Others are weakened by ambiguous requirements, regulatory interpretations, or deficiencies that have persisted despite years of experience demonstrating their consequences.


Whether these shortcomings originated through deliberate compromise, industry influence, or other circumstances does not change the responsibility to correct them once their consequences are known.


After decades of experience, lawmakers should be asking whether the original justifications for these provisions withstand scrutiny, whether meaningful safeguards remain available to homeowners, and why identified deficiencies have not been addressed.


Notably, these issues do not appear to be receiving meaningful attention through the Legislature's special CIC Task Force, established to examine Nevada's common-interest-community laws. With a new administration approaching, the Task Force's future remains uncertain. But whether that body continues is secondary to the larger question of legislative accountability.


The Legislature should direct the Division and CIC Commission to examine these and other known deficiencies, assess their consequences, and recommend appropriate regulatory and legislative corrections.


Example 1: Foreclosure for HSW Fines

The issue: Nevada generally prohibits an HOA from foreclosing on a homeowner's property to collect fines for violations of association rules. That is an important protection against losing one's home over a dispute concerning compliance with HOA restrictions. Yet NRS 116.31162(6) creates exceptions, including, but not limited to, fines involving violations determined to pose an imminent threat of substantial harm to the health, safety, or welfare (HSW) of owners or residents.


Protecting residents from genuine threats to their health, safety, and welfare is an entirely legitimate responsibility. But when a volunteer, part-time HOA board is given broad discretion to determine what constitutes such a threat—and thereby invoke an extraordinary exception to foreclosure protections—how meaningful are those protections? Moreover, fines are imposed after violations occur. If a condition genuinely threatens residents' health, safety, or welfare, imposing a fine does not eliminate that danger. The appropriate response is to correct the hazardous condition, not to invoke the extraordinary remedy of foreclosure to collect a monetary penalty.


Associations have other means of addressing dangerous conditions, including enforcement proceedings and appropriate court orders. The consequences of an erroneous or overly expansive interpretation can be devastating. A disagreement over whether a condition qualifies for the exception can place a homeowner's most significant financial asset at risk.


The reform question: Should an HOA board's determination that a violation presents a HSW concern be sufficient to transform an otherwise protected homeowner's property into an asset subject to foreclosure for an unpaid fine?



Example 2: Owners Have a Voice in Decisions—But Do They Really?

The issue: Nevada law promises homeowners open board meetings, opportunities to comment, access to association records, and a voice in approving budgets. But what good are those protections when important decisions can be developed, effectively settled, and approved without meaningful homeowner participation?


Consider four cases.


Budget approval: Nevada law does not expressly require boards to provide homeowners with proposed budgets before the meetings at which they are adopted. Owners may therefore have little opportunity to understand or question spending decisions beforehand. And rejecting an adopted budget requires a majority of all unit owners—not merely those voting at the ratification meeting—a threshold so demanding that meaningful rejection becomes practically unattainable for all but the smallest associations.


Board workshops: Directors may discuss important association business in gatherings characterized as "workshops", bypassing notice, agenda, and participation requirements.


Email voting: Nevada's nonprofit corporation provisions allow certain board actions by written consent without a meeting. The Real Estate Division has acknowledged concerns about using such procedures for HOA decisions, yet the interaction between these provisions and homeowner meeting protections remains unresolved. The result can be an appearance of homeowner participation and transparency while the decisions that matter are effectively made elsewhere.


Reserve funding compounds the concern. Boards must maintain adequate reserves, but homeowners may have limited insight into expenditures, while NRS 116.3115(2)(b) permits necessary and reasonable assessments to restore adequate reserves without a separate owner vote. Reserves are not unrestricted discretionary funds. But the ability to spend them and subsequently replenish them through homeowner assessments makes meaningful transparency and accountability especially important.


The reform question: Why does Nevada promise homeowners participation in HOA governance while permitting procedures that can leave them without meaningful opportunities to examine, question, or influence decisions before they are made?


Example 3: When a Financial Conflict Disqualifies an Owner-Elected Director—but Not a Developer Appointee

The issue: NRS 116.31034(10)(a)(2) prohibits an individual who stands to gain personal profit or compensation from a matter before the board from serving as an HOA director—unless that individual was appointed by the developer. The apparent protection against financial conflicts applies to directors elected by homeowners, but not to those appointed by the developer.


The restriction can prevent homeowners from electing or retaining a director of their choosing, even though other conflict-of-interest provisions provide mechanisms for disclosure, abstention, and scrutiny of interested transactions. Meanwhile, the same potential financial interest does not trigger this statutory disqualification when the director was appointed by the developer.


What justifies denying homeowners the right to elect someone with a financial interest that Nevada expressly permits in a developer appointee? Our examination of the available legislative record has revealed little explanation—and nothing compelling.


The reform question: Why should the source of a director's appointment determine whether a potentially disqualifying financial interest is permitted?


Example 4: Homeowners Must Approve HOA Litigation—Except When Boards Decide Otherwise

The issue: NRS 116.31088 generally requires approval by owners holding a majority of an association's allocated votes before an HOA commences certain civil actions. That is an important protection against committing homeowners' collective resources to litigation without their consent.


But the statute contains broad exceptions allowing boards to proceed without homeowner approval. Some are understandable, including collection of assessments and enforcement of contractual obligations. Two deserve particular scrutiny: counterclaims and litigation undertaken to protect the health, safety, and welfare (HSW) of association members.


The counterclaim exception is not limited to claims necessary to defend an existing lawsuit. It can permit boards to pursue additional affirmative claims without the homeowner approval otherwise required to initiate litigation.


The HSW exception gives boards considerable discretion to characterize litigation as necessary to protect association members, even when no immediate emergency exists. And failure to obtain subsequent homeowner ratification does not necessarily bring the litigation to an end.


Homeowners can therefore be required to finance litigation they never approved, potentially including claims directed against other homeowners, while having little practical ability to stop it.


The reform question: Why does Nevada require substantial homeowner approval before an HOA initiates litigation, yet permit boards to bypass that protection through broad exceptions without meaningful accountability to the owners financing it?


At a minimum, boards should publicly identify and record their reliance on these exceptions, and homeowners should receive meaningful periodic information about litigation costs and financial risks without compromising privileged legal strategy.



Other Protections That Deserve Examination

The four examples just covered are hardly unique. Other provisions of Nevada's HOA laws raise similar concerns.


Must developers control HOA boards at all? NRS 116.31032 permits developers to appoint and remove HOA directors during declarant control, even though those boards are entrusted with protecting homeowners’ interests. As a result, developer appointees make decisions about reserve funding, construction defects, and affiliated contracts that may financially benefit the very developer who appointed them. Courts defer to these decisions rather than subjecting conflicted transactions to the heightened scrutiny familiar in corporate law.


How much should the association assess owners for reserves? Should it investigate potential construction defects in the developer’s work? Should it hire the developer’s affiliated management company? These are not ordinary business decisions. The developer may stand on both sides or receive benefits not shared with other owners. Given that developers already possess special rights to protect their legitimate development interests, how does allowing them to control association governance—potentially for decades—serve homeowners? Does the legislative compromise that created this condition gotoo far?


Financial conflicts—different rules for homeowners and developers: NRS 116.31084 requires HOA directors to disclose and abstain from voting on matters from which they stand to gain personal profit or compensation of any kind. Lawmakers went further, enacting NRS 116.31034(10)(a)(2), which bars individuals from even running for an HOA board if they stand to gain such financial benefits—but expressly exempts developer-appointed directors. Meanwhile, NRS 116.31187(2) exempts developers and their affiliates from certain contracting restrictions. A developer can appoint a majority of the board and have that board approve multimillion-dollar contracts benefiting its own affiliated management company. Why does Nevada impose arguably excessive and ambiguous restrictions on homeowners' freedom to elect directors while expressly permitting developer-controlled arrangements presenting substantial financial conflicts?


Competitive bidding: NAC 116.405(8)(d) requires obtaining at least three bids when practicable as a consideration in assessing directors' conduct. Yet regulators have interpreted bidding as effectively optional or otherwise not enforceable. In its Winter 2022 Community Insights newsletter, the Nevada Real Estate Division explained that because NRS 116.31086 begins with “if an association solicits bids,” it could not find a violation of that statute merely because no bids were solicited. Read more: Competitive Bidding: An Undefined Standard NRED and the Commission Ignore and When Ambiguity Becomes an Advantage


Homeowner access to records—information that arrives too late: NRS 116.31175 gives homeowners access to association records, but allows up to 21 days for copies of certain financial records and does not establish a general advance-production deadline for supporting records concerning upcoming board decisions. What good is the right to examine information supporting a board decision if homeowners cannot obtain it until after the board has already voted? Read more at our page: Accessing Records in the HOA World


Developer control—how long is too long? Assuming lawmakers find sufficient justification for allowing developers to control HOA boards in the first place, NRS 116.31032 promises the eventual transfer of that control to homeowners. Yet lawmakers increased the percentage threshold to 90% for large associations in 2015, while disputes concerning how the threshold is calculated remain unresolved. Developer control can consequently extend for decades—even indefinitely. The critical distinction is between a statutory promise that developer control will terminate and a mechanism that actually makes termination happen. Why has Nevada not established clearer, independently verifiable turnover requirements and effective means of enforcing them? Read more: When the Law and HOA Practices Collide and Declarant Control- a little known dark secret #1.


Our proposed HOA law changes identify numerous additional concerns involving elections, records access, open meetings, financial transparency, and other matters affecting homeowners.


Different laws, different shortcomings—but the same recurring concern: homeowner protections that appear meaningful on paper yet offer far less protection in practice.


Beyond the Facade: When Regulatory Capture Undermines Homeowner Protection

The examples above are only a sample of Nevada's homeowner protections in need of repair. A protection can become a facade in more than one way. Lawmakers may enact exceptions that undermine its purpose, ambiguous requirements may permit the very conduct a protection was intended to prevent, or regulators may allow known deficiencies to persist without pursuing clarification or reform. For homeowners, the result can be much the same: rights that appear at first glance as meaningful, offer little practical protection.


Taken together, these examples suggest a broader problem of regulatory capture—a legal framework shaped by organized industry interests while dispersed homeowners lack comparable resources and influence. As law professor W.C. Bunting explains in his examination of developer-controlled associations, this imbalance can favor developer and industry interests over established principles of fiduciary accountability, meaningful homeowner protections, and the fair and consistent application of the law.


Nevada's extraordinary 2003 reforms represented a fundamental departure from reliance on private civil litigation. They placed homeowner protection at center stage by establishing specialized public oversight and enforcement.


Yet the subsequent decline in regulatory initiative has left longstanding weaknesses unresolved, with the consequences favoring those who benefit from limited oversight—effectively pushing homeowners off the very stage lawmakers built for their protection.

Whatever explains the original legislative decisions, continuing to leave these protections unexamined serves the same interests.

But ultimately, the buck stops with lawmakers. They created Nevada's HOA regulatory system, authorized the statutory exceptions, and entrusted the Division and Commission with responsibilities extending beyond administering existing laws.


The Legislature should direct the Division and CIC Commission to examine these and other deficiencies, determine whether their original justifications remain persuasive, and demand the regulatory and legislative changes necessary to make homeowner protections meaningful.


Nevada has accumulated decades of experience identifying shortcomings in its HOA laws. The question is no longer whether enough problems have been brought to light, but whether lawmakers will insist that they be addressed.


Nevada does not need another regulatory system. It needs the institutions already entrusted with homeowner protection to make the one Nevada built work.

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[1] The original 1982 UCIOA itself raises questions about regulatory capture. Its drafters expressly recognized conflicts inherent in developer-controlled associations and surely would have understood the financial and practical challenges homeowners faced when required to enforce their rights largely through an expensive civil litigation system—often against far better-resourced developers and associations. Yet the model act's optional Article 5 administrative framework focused primarily on development registration and sales oversight, rather than comprehensive regulation of ongoing HOA governance. By leaving homeowners largely dependent on private litigation, the drafters arguably embedded the very institutional imbalance Professor Bunting identifies into the model legislation itself. Was this yet another compromise with industry interests?

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