Nevada's HOA Litigation Protections: How Did We Lose Sight of the Original Purpose?

The Legislature established meaningful homeowner protections in 1997. Subsequent legislative changes, judicial interpretations, and unresolved regulatory questions raise serious concerns about whether those protections still function as intended. Action is needed.
A Note to Readers
This is a longer article than we typically publish, and for good reason. It examines nearly three decades of Nevada legislative history, court decisions, and regulatory developments to understand how homeowner protections governing HOA litigation have changed, why they may no longer fulfill their original purpose, and what reforms deserve consideration.
Our objective is not merely to criticize existing law. It is to demonstrate that lawmakers were warned about consequences that remain relevant today, that opportunities to address those concerns existed, and that meaningful reforms are still needed.
Readers seeking a shorter overview of the concerns may wish to begin with Questions 11 and 12 in our article, Have Nevada's HOA Regulators Abandoned Owners? — Part 2. Those primarily interested in proposed solutions can turn to the concluding reform recommendations in this article.
For lawmakers, regulators, HOA professionals, and homeowners interested in understanding how these problems developed, the legislative record matters. Meaningful reform requires more than identifying what is wrong today. It requires understanding how we got here—and why longstanding concerns remain unresolved.

The Beginning
Nearly thirty years ago, Nevada lawmakers recognized that homeowners associations exercise substantial powers affecting residents' property rights and financial obligations. They responded by establishing safeguards, including a requirement that associations generally obtain majority homeowner approval before initiating civil litigation.
That protection was deliberate. Associations already possessed the corporate authority to sue. Lawmakers chose to restrict the exercise of that authority because litigation could expose homeowners to substantial expenses and financial risks without their consent. Yet the protective purpose of that legislation has become increasingly difficult to reconcile with what followed.
Within two years, lawmakers were hearing concerns that associations were invoking litigation exceptions so broadly that the general approval requirement was being undermined. Subsequent legislative compromises altered Subsequent legislative compromises altered, and in some circumstances effectively nullified, the homeowner ratification process, while judicial interpretations raised questions about the approval threshold and the breadth of exempted claims. In 2019, lawmakers narrowed certain litigation-disclosure requirements after receiving assurances that homeowners were already adequately informed.
Meanwhile, the Uniform Law Commission—the organization responsible for the model act underlying Nevada's HOA laws—had independently recognized the need for stronger homeowner protections. Its 2008 revisions expressly required associations to notify homeowners about significant legal proceedings.
The protections lawmakers deliberately established in 1997 have lost much of their intended practical effect. The question is what Nevada's regulatory institutions and Legislature intend to do about it.
In our post, Is Your HOA in Litigation? we identified deficiencies in litigation transparency and three questions concerning the statutory exceptions to homeowner approval. Here we examine how those problems developed and why protecting the Legislature's original policy objective requires action.
1997: Lawmakers Established a Protection for Homeowners
In 1997, Senator Mike Schneider sponsored SB 314, part of a significant legislative effort to strengthen the rights of homeowners living in Nevada's common-interest communities. The legislation established the Office of the Ombudsman, expanded requirements for open meetings and homeowner participation, and imposed important limitations on association authority.
The larger legislative purpose was unmistakable. During the May 1, 1997 Senate Commerce and Labor hearing, Senior Deputy Attorney General Anne Cathcart explained that the legislation was intended to strengthen Nevada's HOA laws and address recurring problems involving confusion, inadequate education, and insufficient remedies. Following enactment, Attorney General Frankie Sue Del Papa described the measure as an effort to protect homeowners' investments and membership rights. Read the Attorney General's July 24, 1997 announcement.
The homeowner-approval provision reflected a fundamental distinction between an HOA and an ordinary private corporation. Homeowners are compelled to share the association's financial obligations. They may disagree with a board's litigation decision yet remain responsible for assessments financing that litigation. Requiring broad homeowner support before committing association resources to certain lawsuits was intended to constrain that authority.
Among those protections was a restriction on an association's existing power to initiate civil litigation.
The law generally required approval from homeowners holding at least a majority of the association's votes before the association could commence a civil action. It also required advance notice of meetings at which litigation would be considered. This was a significant departure from ordinary corporate governance. Although associations possessed the authority to sue, lawmakers determined that their exercise of that authority warranted additional restrictions because the financial consequences would ultimately fall upon homeowners.
The requirement was not absolute. Apart from a separate exemption for time-share associations, lawmakers provided four exceptions: assessment collection, enforcement of governing documents, counterclaims, and litigation involving the health, safety, and welfare of association members. The latter two would prove particularly consequential, becoming the basis for expansive interpretations and practices that have substantially weakened the homeowner protections lawmakers intended to establish.
The legislative policy was nevertheless clear: homeowner approval was to be the general rule, with specified exceptions permitting boards to act without it.
1999: Lawmakers Identify a Vulnerable Exception
Just two years later, the Legislature revisited the litigation-approval requirements in SB 451 (1999). The legislative record is particularly revealing because lawmakers were already concerned that exceptions to homeowner approval were being invoked too broadly.
During the May 25, 1999, Senate Commerce and Labor Committee hearing, Chairman Randolph Townsend explained that the committee had heard concerns about associations characterizing virtually every lawsuit as involving the health, safety, and welfare (HSW) of their members. The Senate had considered language narrowing the exception to imminent threats involving loss of life or serious and permanent property damage, together with stronger ratification and dismissal requirements.
The committee was attempting to address a fundamental problem: an exception intended to accommodate necessary litigation was being interpreted so broadly that it threatened to undermine the general requirement for homeowner approval.
Senator Mike Schneider expressed a related concern about litigation initiated against individual homeowners. He recalled associations spending substantial sums suing their own members and the dissatisfaction those expenditures had created. His remarks demonstrated that lawmakers were concerned not only about construction-defect litigation, but also about the use of association resources in disputes with the very homeowners those associations represented.
The Compromise and Its Consequences
The Senate's effort to narrow the HSW exception encountered a negotiated compromise involving interests engaged in construction-defect litigation. David Pursiano, representing the Nevada Trial Lawyers Association, defended proposed language permitting associations to initiate certain litigation before obtaining homeowner approval, followed by ratification within 90 days.
The justification included legitimate circumstances in which immediate filing might be necessary to preserve legal rights before a statute of limitations expired. Proponents also emphasized the practical difficulty of obtaining affirmative approval from a majority of all homeowners.
But the compromise went considerably further than accommodating time-sensitive litigation.
If an association initiated litigation under the HSW exception and subsequently failed to obtain homeowner ratification, it could seek dismissal for that reason only if a majority of the association's voting power had affirmatively authorized dismissal.
Senator Schneider questioned the voting requirement, clarifying whether the majority meant all association voting power rather than merely those participating in a meeting. Pursiano's response was explicit:
"Correct ... it's all members, the voting power of the association."
The distinction was fundamental. A majority of homeowners participating in a meeting might oppose continuing litigation, but their votes would not necessarily satisfy a requirement based on the association's total voting power.
More consequentially, failing to obtain affirmative homeowner approval to pursue litigation would not, by itself, establish the separate majority needed to authorize its dismissal.
The practical consequences, particularly in today's large HOAs, can make homeowner control virtually impossible to exercise.
Consider an association with 10,000 equally weighted votes. Now consider our observation that associations typically obtain less than 15% homeowner participation in board elections. For litigation requiring advance homeowner approval, the board must first obtain at least 5,001 affirmative votes before proceeding. Without that approval, litigation cannot be initiated under the general rule. This was a deliberately high hurdle, reflecting lawmakers' reluctance to permit associations to undertake litigation outside the four other statutory exceptions.
The HSW exception permits a board to initiate litigation without first obtaining those votes, but unlike the other exceptions, that authority is conditioned on obtaining affirmative homeowner ratification within 90 days. Arguably, lawmakers recognized the need to permit boards to respond promptly to threats involving members' health, safety, or welfare. But notably, they preserved homeowners' authority to decide whether the litigation should continue.
Yet the negotiated dismissal provision creates a remarkable contradiction: the same 5,001 votes that were unnecessary to begin litigation may effectively be needed to stop it. The result is that a board can initiate litigation without homeowner approval, while homeowners face a nearly insurmountable burden to stop litigation they never authorized.
Compounding the problem, the HSW exception is broadly worded and susceptible to expansive interpretation. Without meaningful limits on what qualifies as a health, safety, or welfare matter, boards may invoke the exception in circumstances far removed from genuine emergencies. Combined with the nearly insurmountable burden homeowners may face in stopping litigation, the exception threatens to swallow the general rule requiring homeowner approval.
Setting aside why this was considered an acceptable legislative compromise, the fundamental questions remain: What meaningful homeowner protection does the 90-day ratification requirement provide if failure to obtain ratification does not necessarily prevent litigation from continuing? And when the HSW exception itself can be interpreted so broadly, is the promised protection a facade?
The disagreement exposed a fundamental conflict in policy objectives.
On one side were legitimate concerns about preserving litigation rights, particularly in construction-defect disputes. On the other was the Legislature's effort to ensure that homeowners—not merely association boards and those representing them—retained meaningful control over litigation undertaken in their name.
Townsend refused to accept the Assembly's changes, and his committee unanimously supported that position. The bill advanced only after a conference committee process. The record does not explain why the Senate ultimately accepted provisions its Commerce and Labor Committee had rejected.
The Senate's proposed restriction limiting HSW litigation to imminent threats involving loss of life or serious and permanent property damage did not survive. The broader exception remained, together with the 90-day ratification procedure and the additional restriction on dismissal when homeowner ratification failed.
Read the enacted legislation: SB 451 (1999), Chapter 572.
A representative of the Southern Nevada Home Builders Association, explained that those negotiating the compromise believed stronger litigation disclosures would encourage greater homeowner participation. He acknowledged that they did not know whether that expectation would prove correct. In other words, proponents recognized the difficulty of obtaining affirmative majority votes but believed meaningful information about proposed litigation would motivate more homeowners to participate.
That was an important assumption underlying the compromise—not an established fact.
The significance became clearer twenty years later. In 2019, lawmakers amended NRS 116.31088 to limit the required written disclosures concerning litigation costs, potential benefits, and adverse consequences to lawsuits on which homeowners were entitled to vote. The change left the HSW ratification-related disclosure requirement in place but narrowed disclosures for other litigation undertaken without homeowner approval.
If meaningful disclosure was part of the justification for accepting weaker homeowner control in 1999, why did lawmakers subsequently agree to narrow those disclosures without reconsidering whether the original compromise was still providing adequate homeowner protection?
An Unresolved Policy Problem
The practical circumstances advanced to justify retaining the broader exception—particularly construction-defect litigation and the need to preserve claims before filing deadlines—were more limited than the range of disputes that could be characterized as involving homeowners' health, safety, or welfare.
The legislative record does not establish that lawmakers anticipated every circumstance in which associations might later invoke the exception. It does establish that they recognized the danger of expansive interpretations and understood the consequences of shifting the burden of stopping litigation onto homeowners.
Despite Townsend's objections, the Legislature enacted the disputed ratification and dismissal provisions through SB 451. Although Townsend explained that the Senate committee had attempted to limit the HSW exception to imminent threats involving loss of life or serious and permanent property damage, that restriction did not survive. The Legislature retained the much broader health, safety, and welfare language—the very language Townsend warned was being used to bypass homeowner approval.
The result was a striking departure from the underlying purpose of the 1997 protection: boards could initiate qualifying litigation first, while homeowners could be left with the responsibility of organizing a majority to stop it.
2008–2009: National Reform and Schneider's Attempt to Correct the Problem
In 2008, the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), whose model legislation provided the foundation for Nevada's common-interest ownership laws, adopted revisions intended to strengthen homeowners' position in their relationships with association boards and managers.
Among those changes was a requirement that associations promptly notify homeowners of significant legal proceedings involving their association, with exceptions for routine enforcement and collection matters. The ULC recognized the importance of protecting homeowners when associations exercise substantial authority affecting their interests.
Senator Schneider Sought to Correct the Problem
A year later, Senator Mike Schneider introduced SB 182 (2009), proposing changes to Nevada's provisions governing homeowner approval and ratification of association litigation.
Among the proposed changes was a requirement that an association seek dismissal when it failed to obtain the necessary homeowner approval. The proposal also sought to prevent associations from using the health, safety, and welfare exception to bypass advance homeowner approval in construction-defect litigation.
These changes addressed two concerns that had emerged in the 1999 legislative debate: the breadth of the HSW exception and the burden imposed on homeowners when litigation proceeded without their affirmative consent.
SB 182 was ultimately enacted, but these proposed corrections were not included in the final legislation.
The Legislature therefore had another opportunity to reconsider the 1999 compromise, but the disputed ratification and dismissal provisions remained.
The consequences extend beyond the construction-defect disputes that helped shape the earlier debate. The broadly worded HSW exception is not expressly confined to construction-defect litigation. A board may invoke it in other types of disputes that it determines involve the health, safety, or welfare of association members.
The statute provides no independent screening requirement before that determination is used to bypass homeowner approval. Once litigation begins, the difficulty of obtaining the required majority vote can leave homeowners with little practical opportunity to reverse the decision.
The underlying question remains the one Townsend raised in 1999: Why should homeowners bear the burden of stopping litigation their association initiated without their approval?
2011: Nevada Considered National Reforms but Omitted a Litigation Protection
Nevada lawmakers have long looked to the Uniform Law Commission for guidance in developing the state's common-interest ownership laws. Chapter 116 was originally based on the ULC's 1982 model, and subsequent legislative sessions incorporated additional provisions from its later revisions.
The 2011 Legislature continued that practice through SB 204, incorporating selected amendments from the ULC's 1994 and 2008 revisions.
But one homeowner protection was conspicuously absent: the ULC's 2008 requirement that associations promptly notify homeowners of significant legal proceedings.
Why Was the Litigation-Notification Protection Omitted?
The proposed changes originated with a working group of attorneys from the Real Property Section of the State Bar of Nevada. The group reviewed the model-law revisions, met five times in 2010, and developed recommendations for legislative consideration.
In a May 10, 2011, submission to the Assembly Judiciary Committee, attorney Michael Buckley explained that the group had not proposed changes where it believed Nevada law already addressed the subject.
Yet the group's recommendations did not include the ULC's litigation-notification requirement, and its written analysis did not specifically explain why.
Nevada already had statutory requirements governing litigation approval, periodic board review of pending litigation, and settlement disclosures. But those provisions did not establish the equivalent of prompt notification when an association became involved in significant legal proceedings.
When Nevada considered updating Chapter 116 in 2011, why did the ULC's litigation-notification provision not become an equivalent Nevada requirement?
The available legislative record does not answer that question. Nor does it establish whether the working group considered existing Nevada protections sufficient, deliberately excluded the provision, or simply overlooked it. But the omission raises a broader question about the legislative process:
Does relying heavily on selected legal practitioners to evaluate and recommend changes adequately ensure that homeowner protections developed by the national model-law commission receive meaningful consideration?
The 2011 legislation was enacted without the additional litigation-notification requirement.
Whatever the reason for its omission, the consequence remains: Nevada homeowners still lack an equivalent general statutory right to prompt notification when their association becomes involved in significant litigation—even though the national model-law commission identified that protection years earlier.
2012: A Court Interpretation Further Questions the Approval Requirement
In Donovan v. Flamingo Palms Villas, a federal district court examined Nevada's homeowner litigation-approval statute further setting back owner protection efforts. In February 2012, the court interpreted the voting language to permit authorization by a majority of participating voters, rather than requiring affirmative approval representing a majority of all allocated votes. This appears in stark contrast of what lawmaker had intended.
The court reasoned that applying the same threshold to both a vote and a written agreement would make the written-agreement alternative superfluous. We question that reasoning. A vote and a written agreement are different methods of securing authorization. Requiring the same level of homeowner support under either method does not render one method unnecessary.
Moreover, the court relied partly on general principles allowing associations to initiate litigation without obtaining permission from their members. But Nevada lawmakers had already recognized that corporate authority—and deliberately restricted its exercise through the homeowner-approval requirement. The 1999 legislative testimony confirming that the requirement referred to a majority of all allocated votes makes the competing interpretation especially difficult to reconcile with the historical record.
The Donovan ruling is a federal district court decision, not controlling Nevada Supreme Court precedent. Its voting-threshold discussion was also unnecessary to the ultimate disposition because the court concluded that certain claims qualified for statutory exceptions. Nevertheless, it demonstrates how profoundly different interpretations can affect the practical operation of a homeowner protection.
The Counterclaim Exception
The Donovan litigation also involved the second exception of particular concern—allowing associations to pursue counterclaims without homeowner approval.
The statute does not distinguish between compulsory counterclaims, which may be necessary to preserve legal rights, and permissive counterclaims, which may substantially expand litigation.
The court recognized that the exception encompassed both. It also ultimately permitted certain crossclaims under the statutory exceptions, although crossclaims are not expressly identified in the counterclaim provision. These rulings illustrate how broadly the exceptions can operate.
A recent example illustrates the concern. In litigation in which I am personally involved, my master association filed multiple counterclaims in response to my lawsuit challenging its authority to remove me from a board position to which homeowners had elected me.

The counterclaims include allegations concerning my attempt to seek reelection and alleged failures to make required disclosures in a subsequent election—even though the association had rejected my candidacy and denied me access to the ballot. Remarkably, the association seeks compensatory and punitive damages despite expressly acknowledging in its pleadings that it suffered no damages. I dispute the underlying allegations.
My litigation raises the same broader policy question that concerns homeowners regardless of the merits of any individual dispute: Should an exception intended to preserve an association's ability to defend its legal interests also permit directors to pursue discretionary claims against homeowners that substantially expand litigation, increase financial exposure, or potentially discourage owners from challenging board actions—all without homeowner approval?
That is a question Nevada lawmakers should revisit.
2014: The Regulator Recognized a Disclosure Obligation
As noted in this post in detail, the concerns about litigation transparency have also been known to Nevada regulators for years. In its Spring 2014 Community Insights newsletter, page 7, the Nevada Real Estate Division (NRED) addressed a straightforward question: Must an association notify homeowners when it is sued?
The Division acknowledged that NRS 116 contained no specific notification requirement. Nevertheless, it explained that directors' fiduciary responsibilities under NRS 116.3103 required them to keep homeowners informed of potential liabilities and unbudgeted litigation expenses. It suggested placing the matter on a board meeting agenda and identified other association records that could document the lawsuit.
The significance is that Nevada's regulator recognized an obligation to inform homeowners about litigation even in the absence of an express statutory notification requirement.
Yet the Division's guidance did not establish a clear, enforceable standard specifying what information must be provided, when homeowners must receive it, or how the obligation would be enforced.
More than a decade later, those questions remain unresolved.
Recognizing a homeowner protection is not the same as ensuring that protection operates effectively.
This is not an isolated concern. As we have documented in Nevada HOA Rights Mean Little Without Trusted Enforcement, similar problems arise when statutory protections lack effective regulatory implementation and enforcement.
2019: Lawmakers Narrowed an Existing Homeowner Disclosure Protection
In 2019, Nevada lawmakers establish litigation-disclosure requirements that narrowed protection already contained in NRS 116.31088—a change at odds with earlier lawmakers' homeowner-protection objectives and the national reforms advanced by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC). Before the amendment, subsection 2 required associations, before commencing or seeking to ratify civil litigation, to provide homeowners with a written statement estimating litigation costs, including attorney fees, and explaining potential benefits and adverse consequences, including an unfavorable outcome. The statement also had to include disclosures required upon resale of the property.
The Community Associations Institute (CAI), through attorney Garrett Gordon, proposed an amendment to SB 382 limiting that requirement to litigation on which homeowners were entitled to vote. During the April 5, 2019, Senate Judiciary Committee hearing, Donna Zanetti, representing CAI, defended the amendment, arguing that preparing the litigation cost-and-risk statement was an unnecessary association expense when homeowners had no right to vote on the lawsuit.
Senator Dallas Harris questioned that reasoning, asking whether homeowners should nevertheless have access to information about litigation undertaken by their boards, even when they could not vote on it. Zanetti responded that Nevada law already provided homeowners with the tools necessary to monitor their boards. She pointed to quarterly litigation updates, access to association financial records, and disclosures accompanying property resales.
But those assurances raise an important distinction. Nevada law requires boards to review pending litigation at least quarterly; it does not expressly require them to provide homeowners with a meaningful public report identifying each lawsuit, its costs, material developments, or financial risks.
Similarly, access to financial records upon request does not necessarily provide homeowners with the estimated litigation costs, potential benefits, and adverse consequences addressed by the written statement CAI sought to eliminate.
Despite Senator Harris's questions, the Legislature adopted the proposed limitation through SB 382.
The consequence was significant. Litigation exempt from homeowner approval was also excluded from the requirement to provide homeowners with this written explanation of its anticipated costs, benefits, and adverse consequences.
Homeowner approval and homeowner information are separate protections. Eliminating the need for one does not justify eliminating the other.
The argument that homeowners could obtain litigation information through other means may have been technically correct. But it did not resolve the fundamental difference between requiring an association to provide meaningful information and placing the burden on individual homeowners to seek it out.
CAI justified eliminating the disclosure requirement in part as a way to avoid unnecessary association expenses. We dispute that justification. Consider: before authorizing litigation, responsible directors should already have considered its estimated costs, potential benefits, and financial risks.
Meaningful disclosure would not necessarily require preparing and mailing separate notices to every homeowner. The information could be presented during an open board meeting and incorporated into the meeting minutes, much like other financial information associations are already required to make available. Homeowners attending would hear the disclosure, while others could review the minutes afterward.
Appropriate safeguards could protect privileged legal information without withholding basic financial information about litigation undertaken with association resources.
Rather than eliminating an existing homeowner protection, lawmakers could have clarified how associations should provide the information through their established meeting and records procedures.
The question is why the Legislature eliminated an existing information requirement when a less burdensome method of providing that information was available.
A Striking Inconsistency: Prospective Buyers Versus Existing Homeowners
Nevada law separately requires resale disclosures to identify pending legal actions against an association, providing prospective purchasers with information about litigation that could affect their decision to buy. See NRS 116.4109(1)(d).
Yet Nevada law does not impose an equivalent general requirement to promptly inform existing homeowners about those same lawsuits—even though they already bear the association's financial obligations.
The contrast is striking. Nevada recognizes the importance of litigation information when someone is considering purchasing a home but does not provide the same assurance of disclosure to those who already own one.
Why should a prospective purchaser be entitled to information about litigation that existing homeowners may never have been directly told about?
The 2019 amendment is particularly difficult to reconcile with the Uniform Law Commission's 2008 recommendation that associations promptly inform homeowners about significant legal proceedings.
Rather than strengthening homeowner notification, Nevada narrowed an existing disclosure requirement.
The cumulative effect deserves legislative attention. Boards may initiate litigation under broad exceptions without homeowner approval, while the same exceptions can relieve them of the requirement to explain anticipated litigation costs and consequences. Meanwhile, prospective purchasers retain a separate statutory right to information about pending lawsuits against the association.
These are not merely questions about transparency. They concern whether Nevada's statutory protections remain consistent with the Legislature's original objective of protecting homeowners from the consequences of association litigation undertaken without their consent.
The 2019 change is particularly noteworthy in light of the 1999 legislative negotiations. Twenty years earlier, proponents had defended the litigation compromise partly on the expectation that meaningful disclosures would encourage homeowner participation and counterbalance concerns about weakened voting protections. Yet in 2019, lawmakers narrowed the application of those disclosures without a corresponding reconsideration of the underlying litigation-approval framework. The cumulative effect of these changes deserves examination.
The April 26, 2019 Assembly Judiciary hearing, pages 23–24 confirms that the change was presented as a clarification of longstanding practice, supported by assurances that homeowners could obtain information through quarterly board reviews, financial records, and resale disclosures.
Do Industry Governance Principles Support Greater Transparency?
The Community Associations Institute's own national Community Association Governance Guidelines encourage boards to share critical information and the rationale for decisions affecting residents' financial obligations. Other CAI governance principles encourage regular communication concerning substantive board actions. Its Disclosure Before Sales policy also supports informing prospective purchasers about pending litigation, excluding routine assessment collections. These principles are constructive and consistent with the Coalition's concerns.
They do not establish that CAI supports our particular reform proposals. But they do raise a question worth examining, especially in light of the position taken by CAI representatives during Nevada's 2019 legislative proceedings.
If litigation is important enough to disclose to prospective purchasers, why should existing homeowners receive less meaningful information about litigation they are required to finance?
Nor is disclosure of litigation risk an unfamiliar practice.
Publicly traded corporations must report material legal proceedings under SEC Regulation S-K, Item 103, and disclose certain financial loss contingencies under established accounting requirements. These obligations do not generally require public disclosure of privileged attorney-client communications or litigation strategy.
HOAs are not publicly traded corporations, and those requirements do not apply to them. But the comparison demonstrates that meaningful litigation reporting and protection of confidential legal advice are not mutually exclusive.
The Coalition proposes substantially less extensive reporting than the public-company framework.
2026: The Ratification Problem Remains Relevant
A recent controversy involving Sun City Summerlin illustrates why the health, safety, and welfare ratification provisions still warrant examination. In a May 21, 2026 letter, association counsel advanced an interpretation under which failure to obtain affirmative homeowner ratification would not necessarily require the association to discontinue litigation commenced under the HSW exception.
That interpretation draws upon language that emerged from the 1999 legislative compromise and remains in NRS 116.31088(1)(e). The interpretation is not necessarily unlawful simply because it permits litigation to continue without affirmative ratification. Indeed, the legislative history we have examined helps explain why that result may follow from the statutory language.
But the problem is no longer merely uncertainty about what the law means. The 1999 legislative record reveals that lawmakers adopted a procedure under which failing to obtain homeowner approval would not necessarily authorize dismissal. Senator Schneider sought to correct that arrangement in 2009, but his proposal was not enacted.
The continued reliance on that language in 2026 demonstrates why the Legislature should reconsider the underlying policy—not simply clarify its interpretation. A statute requiring homeowner ratification should have a clearly understood meaning and meaningful consequence.
If an association can proceed despite failing to obtain the approval the statute says must be secured, what protection does the ratification requirement actually provide?
And answering that question should not depend upon the willingness or financial ability of an individual homeowner to initiate another lawsuit.
What Needs to Be Restored?
The Coalition is not advocating that directors obtain homeowner approval for every lawsuit. Associations must be able to enforce legitimate obligations, preserve legal rights, defend claims, and respond promptly when circumstances require action.
But those legitimate needs do not justify exceptions so broad that they can substantially defeat the homeowner approval requirement itself. Nor does informing homeowners about litigation after it begins restore the authority they were originally intended to exercise.
Our proposed reforms therefore begin with the authority granted to association boards, followed by the transparency and accountability necessary when exceptions legitimately apply.
First, Restore Meaningful Limits on Board Litigation Authority
The Legislature should undertake a comprehensive reconsideration of the exceptions in NRS 116.31088. The health, safety, and welfare exception warrants particular attention.
Genuine emergencies and time-sensitive legal obligations may justify allowing an association to initiate litigation before obtaining homeowner approval. But those circumstances do not justify an exception so broadly worded that boards can characterize ordinary disputes as HSW matters and bypass the general approval requirement.
An association should not be able to avoid homeowner approval merely by declaring that litigation concerns the health, safety, or welfare of its members.
The Legislature should direct the Nevada Real Estate Division and the CIC Commission to establish clear, enforceable standards for notifying homeowners of significant association litigation, disclosing its financial consequences, and ensuring compliance with those requirements.
The ratification and dismissal provisions also need correction.
As the 1999 debate demonstrated, failing to obtain affirmative approval to pursue litigation is not necessarily equivalent to obtaining the majority vote required to authorize its dismissal.
Failure to obtain the required ratification should have meaningful consequences, rather than requiring homeowners to organize another majority vote to undo litigation they never authorized. Senator Schneider's 2009 SB 182 proposal provides a starting point for reconsidering that arrangement.
The counterclaim exception likewise warrants examination.
Associations must be able to defend themselves and assert compulsory counterclaims necessary to preserve legal rights. But the exception has also been interpreted to encompass permissive counterclaims, which may substantially expand the scope and expense of litigation.
The federal court's 2011 ruling in Donovan illustrates that distinction.
The Legislature should reconsider whether an exception justified by the need to defend an association should also permit directors to pursue discretionary claims against homeowners without obtaining their approval.
These are questions of legislative policy, not merely statutory interpretation. The fundamental issue is whether the exceptions continue to serve their intended purposes or have displaced the homeowner authority the Legislature established in 1997.
Second, Restore Meaningful Homeowner Information and Board Accountability
When litigation legitimately proceeds without prior homeowner approval, boards should provide meaningful, nonprivileged information about the nature of the lawsuit, the reasons for pursuing it, its anticipated costs and financial consequences, and material developments.
The Legislature should reconsider its 2019 narrowing of NRS 116.31088(2).
As our review of the legislative hearing demonstrated, the amendment was defended partly on cost-saving grounds and assurances that homeowners already had adequate means of obtaining litigation information. But those assurances did not resolve the distinction between requiring an association to provide meaningful information and placing the burden on individual homeowners to discover it.
The Legislature could have addressed concerns about the cost of disclosure through existing board meeting and records procedures rather than narrowing the homeowner information requirement itself.
Nevada should also reconsider the Uniform Law Commission's 2008 recommendation for prompt notification of significant legal proceedings.
Homeowners should not be required to discover litigation independently, particularly when their association has initiated proceedings without their approval. At a minimum, reasonable, nonprivileged information about pending litigation, anticipated costs, financial consequences, and material developments should be made available through ordinary association governance procedures.
We also believe boards should record a public vote before invoking exceptions to homeowner litigation approval.
Where immediate action is genuinely necessary, the board should document its decision and conduct a public ratification vote at the next open board meeting. That would allow homeowners to know which directors authorized the use of association resources and the stated reasons for doing so.
Attorney-client privilege, legitimate litigation strategy, and homeowner privacy would remain protected. These measures would not replace homeowner approval. They would provide additional safeguards where the Legislature determines that board action without prior homeowner authorization is justified.
The Regulatory Institutions Have a Responsibility
Not every concern requires the Legislature to act before regulators can begin examining the problem.
The voting-threshold issue warrants clarification of how the existing approval requirement should be understood. The breadth of the counterclaim exception and the consequences of unsuccessful HSW ratification also warrant administrative examination.
Neither NRED nor the Commission for Common-Interest Communities and Condominium Hotels can substitute for the courts or conclusively resolve every disputed legal question. But Nevada's regulatory framework provides mechanisms for examining recurring problems, requesting legal opinions, issuing administrative interpretations where authorized, and recommending regulatory or legislative corrections.
The Nevada Real Estate Division and CIC Commission should examine whether existing requirements are being interpreted, implemented, and enforced consistently with their protective purposes.
Most importantly, regulatory clarification should not become a substitute for legislative correction when the problem lies in the authority the statute itself grants.
The Coalition believes these questions warrant public Commission examination and legislative attention—not another decade of uncertainty.
Conclusion: Restore the Protection, Not Merely the Language
Nevada lawmakers established homeowner litigation-approval protections in 1997 because they recognized that association litigation could expose homeowners to substantial financial obligations without their consent.
That was a deliberate policy decision. The subsequent history demonstrates how those protections have been altered and narrowed, while expansive judicial and professional interpretations have raised additional questions about their practical effect.
In 1999, Chairman Randolph Townsend challenged an approach that shifted the burden of stopping litigation onto homeowners, even as the Legislature retained the broadly worded HSW exception.
In 2009, Senator Mike Schneider sought to correct that ratification and dismissal problem. His proposed reforms were not enacted.
The Uniform Law Commission independently recognized the need for stronger homeowner litigation notification in 2008, but Nevada did not incorporate that provision when considering selected model-law reforms in 2011.
In 2014, NRED recognized that directors' fiduciary obligations called for informing homeowners about potential litigation liabilities and unbudgeted expenses, yet clear standards for providing that information remain lacking.
Judicial interpretations have illustrated how the approval threshold and statutory exceptions may operate more broadly than homeowners might expect.
And in 2019, lawmakers narrowed an existing written litigation-disclosure protection after receiving assurances that homeowners were already adequately informed.
These developments do not establish that every legislative compromise was mistaken or every expansive legal interpretation unlawful. But the historical record does establish that lawmakers repeatedly confronted concerns about the erosion of homeowner authority.
Townsend recognized the danger in 1999. Schneider attempted to address part of it in 2009. Yet the disputed statutory mechanism remains in place today. Taken together, these developments raise a fundamental policy question:
Does Nevada's current framework still provide the meaningful homeowner control, financial awareness, and accountability that lawmakers sought to establish nearly thirty years ago?
The answer should not depend on which homeowner can afford to finance the next legal challenge.
Nevada's regulatory institutions and Legislature should reexamine the cumulative effect of these legislative decisions and judicial interpretations, clarify the protections that remain, and restore those that no longer function as intended.
Otherwise, broad exceptions and expansive interpretations may continue to diminish the very safeguards lawmakers enacted.
The objective is not simply better wording in NRS 116. It is restoring the homeowner protections that wording was intended to provide.
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Postscript: Where Were Nevada's HOA Regulators?
In researching this article, we examined decades of legislative history, statutory provisions, court decisions, and regulatory materials. That work identified several ways in which Nevada's existing litigation laws may fall short of the homeowner protections lawmakers intended to provide.
NRED has explained the existing litigation requirements and has enforced certain disclosure obligations. But explaining and enforcing existing law is not the same as examining whether those requirements adequately protect homeowners.
That raises a larger question: Where were the Division and the Commission for Common-Interest Communities and Condominium Hotels in identifying these shortcomings and, more importantly, advancing proposals to correct them?
The Commission was established to do more than administer existing regulations. Its statutory responsibilities include examining the operation and management of common-interest communities and identifying needed improvements.
I have closely followed the Commission's proceedings for more than nine years, attending most of its meetings. I do not recall a single agenda item devoted to examining whether Nevada's HOA litigation laws adequately protect homeowners or whether the statutory exceptions have undermined the Legislature's intended safeguards. That observation is not a substitute for a comprehensive review of the Commission's records, but it raises a legitimate question about its oversight priorities.
If an independent homeowner advocacy organization can identify these concerns by examining publicly available legislative and regulatory records, should we not expect the institutions specifically established to protect homeowners to undertake similar examinations—and advance needed reforms?
This is precisely the broader concern addressed in our three-part series, Have Nevada's HOA Regulators Abandoned Homeowners? The issue is not simply whether regulators are performing their existing administrative functions. It is whether they are using their experience and statutory authority to identify weaknesses in homeowner protections and help correct them.

