Restore the HOA Regulatory System's Effectiveness
Part 3 — Have Nevada's HOA Regulators Abandoned Homeowners?
Nevada has spent decades establishing statutory protections for homeowners living in common-interest communities. Yet many of the same problems continue to confront those homeowners, despite the laws intended to protect them.
Parts 1 and 2 of this series documented those problems, including recurring failures involving the interpretation, implementation, and enforcement of existing homeowner protections.
The explanation is not that Nevada needs more laws. A larger problem is the regulatory institutions are no longer performing an essential responsibility lawmakers intended: learning from recurring problems and using that experience to improve Nevada's HOA laws, regulations, and enforcement practices.
The regulatory system was intended to evolve. Its experience was supposed to inform its improvement.
Effective homeowner protection was the overarching objective lawmakers sought. In 2015, former Senator Mike Schneider, one of the principal architects of Nevada's HOA regulatory framework, explicitly questioned whether that objective was being achieved. Schneider had helped establish the Ombudsman's office and later the CIC Commission to provide homeowner assistance, investigations, and independent regulatory oversight. His subsequent experience had convinced him that the intended separation of responsibilities was not functioning as he and lawmakers envisioned.
Schneider believed the original system had worked, due in large part to the leadership and abilities of the original Commission appointees, but had lost its effectiveness. His proposed remedy was institutional separation believing meaningful investigative independence required removing the Ombudsman and its investigative functions from NRED's administrative control.
The record examined in this final installment suggests that the loss of independent regulatory judgment remains central to understanding why homeowner protections so often fail in practice.
A Regulatory Commission That Once Helped Shape Nevada's HOA Laws
Nevada lawmakers did not establish the CIC Commission merely to hear disciplinary cases or approve regulations presented by NRED.
The Commission was intended to play a broader role in Nevada's HOA regulatory system—one that extended beyond adjudicating violations to identifying recurring problems, evaluating the effectiveness of existing laws, and helping develop necessary corrections. Its early leadership understood and exercised that responsibility.
In 2006, Michael Buckley, the Commission's first chairman, described how Commission hearings and public participation helped identify deficiencies in existing laws and regulations. He described a Commission actively engaged in developing regulations, participating in legislative reforms, and drawing upon the experience of homeowners and other stakeholders to identify needed improvements.
The Commission was not simply waiting for the Division to tell it what needed attention.
In 2009 legislative testimony, Buckley explained why the Commission's rulemaking authority was important. He cautioned lawmakers against placing excessive regulatory detail in statute, explaining that doing so made future corrections more difficult. He described how the Commission had developed, amended, and was again revising a regulation through a process involving public hearings and stakeholder participation. Such changes could be made without requiring the Legislature to revisit every issue.
In effect, Buckley was urging lawmakers to let the regulatory system they had established do its job. The Legislature could establish the governing principles and homeowner protections, while the Commission developed and refined regulations as experience revealed the need for clarification or improvement.
Buckley's description of an active, responsive Commission was consistent with the statutory framework lawmakers established. NRS 116.615 grants the Commission substantial rulemaking authority. NRS 116.665 goes further, requiring the Commission to collect and maintain accurate information concerning violations and the effects of Nevada's HOA laws and regulations on the operation and management of common-interest communities. These responsibilities extend well beyond adjudicating individual disputes.
The Commission was expected to exercise independent judgment, learn from regulatory experience, and use that knowledge to improve the system. Buckley's testimony illustrates how that responsibility was once exercised.
Nearly two decades later, the concern is almost the reverse of the one Buckley expressed. He cautioned lawmakers against legislating so much detail that the regulatory system could not readily respond to problems. Today, homeowners increasingly look to lawmakers to address problems the Commission may already possess authority to examine and resolve.
Whether lawmakers heeded Buckley's caution about excessive statutory detail is debatable. What is more apparent from the Commission's subsequent record is that its independent regulatory initiative has diminished. Rather than routinely identifying problems and directing regulatory improvements, the Commission has increasingly limited itself to considering matters the Division chooses to present.
The statutory responsibilities remain. The question is why the Commission is no longer exercising them with the initiative demonstrated by its early leadership.
Violations Found. Problems Left Unexamined.
Nevada's Real Estate Division regularly investigates homeowner complaints and reports its findings to the CIC Commission. Those reports reveal a persistent concentration of problems involving the conduct of HOA boards.
Consider the Division's own findings:
2024: Investigators identified 32 violations (64% of all “found” issues) involving four board fiduciary or prohibited actions.
2025: The same categories found in the prior 2024 reporting period accounted for 61 (52% of all “found” issues) in 2025.
2026: Although the reporting format changed and total numbers no longer reported, the four leading categories by percentage of alleged violations again involved executive board conduct, including board meeting requirements and homeowners' rights to speak.
The Ombudsman continues investigating and finding an alarming number of violations, appearing to double from 2024 to 2025, involving HOA boards—the same categories that consistently dominate its reports. Yet throughout this three-year period, not a single Commission agenda item was devoted to examining the recurring problems revealed by homeowner complaints and NRED's investigative findings.
At the June 2025 meeting, Commissioner Robert Sweetin requested that outstanding commissioner concerns be discussed with Division staff. Subsequent Commission agendas, however, show no corresponding examination or substantive follow-through.
Investigating homeowner complaints continues and the Commission continues adjudicating cases referred to it. But those activities do not substitute for examining the recurring problems revealed by the investigations. The Commission's published minutes provide no evidence that it has undertaken a substantive examination of why these violations persist or what regulatory changes might prevent them.
That is precisely the broader function of the Commission Buckley described to lawmakers in 2009.
Investigative Confidentiality Prevents Accountability
The Division's investigative reports reveal recurring categories of violations. What they do not reveal is how individual investigations were resolved, what legal interpretations guided those decisions, or what corrective actions were required. Most importantly, they provide little basis for determining whether those decisions reflect consistent enforcement of Nevada law.
That distinction matters because most homeowner complaints never reach the Commission for adjudication.
Under NRS 116.750 and NRS 116.765, the Division investigates alleged violations and pursues formal disciplinary proceedings when warranted. The CIC Commission and its hearing panels possess jurisdiction to take appropriate disciplinary action.
Not every investigation requires a formal hearing. Administrative resolution can be appropriate, particularly when violations can be corrected without disciplinary proceedings. But an administrative resolution should not make the Division's interpretation of Nevada law and its response to established violations effectively inaccessible to independent examination.
The Division's interpretation of the law can become the controlling administrative decision without producing a public explanation or a Commission determination.
The Coalition has identified NRED investigations closed based solely on an association board's reliance on advice from its legal counsel, without a documented independent determination that the challenged conduct complied with Nevada law. Advice of counsel may be relevant to evaluating a board's conduct, but it should not substitute for determining whether the law was followed. When such decisions remain confidential, neither homeowners nor the Commission can readily examine the legal reasoning behind them.
The consequences extend to the Commission's oversight responsibilities.
The Coalition has questioned whether the confidentiality restrictions of NRS 116.757 should prevent the Commission from receiving information necessary to fulfill its statutory responsibilities. Protecting investigative records from public disclosure serves a legitimate purpose. But denying the Commission meaningful access to investigative outcomes and administrative dispositions raises a different question: How can the regulatory body responsible for improving Nevada's HOA regulations evaluate enforcement practices it is not permitted to examine?
The legislative history warrants examination. NRS 116.757 was enacted to protect investigative information, and its confidentiality provisions were strengthened in 2009. Of particular concern is the prohibition against disclosing confidential information to “any person.” Yet NRS 0.039 generally excludes governmental agencies from the statutory definition of “person.”
The statutory language itself raises a legitimate interpretive question: Does “any person” include the CIC Commission, thereby preventing it from receiving investigative information necessary to fulfill its statutory responsibilities?
In a February 11, 2025 memorandum titled The Role of the Commissioners – CICCH, the Director of Nevada's Department of Business and Industry interpreted NRS 116.757 as restricting the Commission's access to confidential investigative information, even when sought in connection with its statutory responsibilities. That interpretation is not a formal Attorney General opinion or a binding judicial determination.
The Coalition has asked the Commission to seek a formal Attorney General opinion under NRS 116.620(3)(a) addressing whether “any person” includes the Commission or an authorized committee acting in its official oversight capacity. To our knowledge, the Commission has not acted on that request or independently resolved the statutory ambiguity, leaving the Director's interpretation effectively unchallenged.
This is not a demand that every investigative document become public or that every closed complaint be adjudicated. A homeowner's identity, witness statements, and sensitive investigative evidence may warrant continued protection. But the legal standards applied, the disposition of completed investigations, corrective actions required, and recurring patterns of violations raise separate transparency and oversight considerations.
There is also an inconsistency deserving legislative examination. Under NRS 116.760, the accused party must receive notice of the allegations as part of the intervention process. The parties may therefore know the identity of the association or person under investigation while other information remains confidential.
The question is whether Nevada's confidentiality framework has become so restrictive that it protects not only investigative information but also shields the Division's administrative decisions from meaningful examination.
The Commission cannot meaningfully evaluate the effectiveness of Nevada's HOA laws without access to information about how those laws are being enforced. Nor can homeowners reasonably understand the standards governing their communities when consequential legal interpretations remain confined to confidential correspondence.
An effective enforcement system should do more than investigate and close individual complaints. It should learn from those investigations, ensure consistency in the application of Nevada law, and use that experience to improve homeowner protections.
The CIC Commission Is Abdicating Its Rulemaking Responsibility
Enforcement addresses violations after they occur. But recurring homeowner complaints may also reveal ambiguities in the law, conflicting interpretations, or regulations that fail to give effect to the Legislature's intended protections.
As former Commission Chairman Michael Buckley explained in 2009, the Commission's rulemaking authority was intended to provide a means of addressing such problems without requiring lawmakers to revisit every issue. Yet the historical record reveals a substantial decline in the Commission's independent initiative.
No formal transfer of the Commission's responsibilities to the Division has been identified. Rather, the change appears to have occurred through administrative practice.
In 2013 alone, the Commission pursued four regulatory efforts. More importantly, it maintained a standing agenda item devoted to reviewing existing regulations, considering proposed changes, and receiving public comment. [2]
The Commission could identify regulatory deficiencies and direct NRED to prepare proposed language. That is precisely what occurred with R050-13, addressing reserve studies, financial reporting, and board responsibilities. [3]
That standing review process subsequently disappeared. The Commission continued considering regulations, including Division-presented proposals in 2020, an outside petition in 2021, R129-21 in 2022, and R091-25 in September 2026, although final Legislative Commission approval of R091-25 has not been established. But the identified record shows considerably less independent Commission initiative in identifying regulatory problems and directing their resolution.
The important distinction is not simply how many regulations were considered. It is who identified the problems, who decided they warranted attention, and who controlled whether they reached the Commission.
The Commission's own earlier decisions demonstrate that this was not always the practice. In July 2011, the Commission considered a petition from homeowner advocate Jonathan Friedrich seeking repeal of an existing regulation, R199-09. In its seven-page written decision, the Commission expressly identified itself as the proper body to consider the petition under NRS 233B.100. It heard the petitioner's arguments, deliberated, and denied the petition by a 5–0 vote, explaining its reasons.
A decade later, on February 2, 2021, the Commission considered a petition from Cameron Clark, president of Nevada Association Services, requesting increases in HOA collection fees under NAC 116.470. Administrator Sharath Chandra acknowledged the petition process under NRS 233B.100 and recommended that the Commission direct the Division to bring the issue forward for rulemaking. Following consideration, the Commission voted to proceed.
The petitions produced different outcomes. Friedrich's was rejected; Clark's was advanced. But both received substantive consideration by the Commission itself.
The measure of an effective petition process is not whether proposals are approved. It is whether the regulatory body responsible for the decision considers them and explains its disposition.
Now contrast those proceedings with the Coalition's experience.
The Coalition has submitted 12 rulemaking petitions addressing recurring homeowner problems. None seeks to create new statutory rights—a responsibility reserved for lawmakers. Instead, they seek clarification of ambiguities and deficiencies in implementing existing protections, many of which the Division itself has identified or acknowledged.
Examples include requirements for competitive bidding; homeowner notice and participation in board workshops; virtual-only meetings and what constitutes a board meeting; director eligibility and conflicts of interest; declarant-control thresholds; and approval of association contracts and policies by email without a properly noticed meeting.
These are not merely theoretical disagreements. They concern how existing homeowner protections are interpreted, administered, and enforced. When those interpretations remain unresolved, associations and homeowners may be left operating under different understandings of the same law.
Nevada law does not require the Commission to adopt every proposed regulation. But NRS 233B.100 establishes a formal process through which interested persons may petition for regulatory changes.
The 2011 Friedrich and 2021 Clark proceedings demonstrate how the Commission previously exercised independent judgment in considering such petitions. One was rejected, the other advanced, but both received substantive consideration by the Commission itself.
More than a year after the Coalition's 12 petitions were submitted, none was rejected within the statutory 30-day period, and none has received substantive Commission consideration. The Commission has been made aware of these petitions, yet there is no identifiable independent Commission action to address them.
The Division can review petitions, provide legal and technical advice, and recommend whether particular regulatory changes should advance. But those administrative responsibilities should support the Commission in fulfilling its statutory duties—not substitute for the Commission's independent judgment.
And when a proposed regulation exceeds the Commission's authority, that need not end the inquiry. The Commission can identify the underlying statutory deficiency and bring it to lawmakers' attention.
The purpose of regulatory review is not simply to determine whether particular language can be adopted. It is to examine whether existing homeowner protections are functioning as lawmakers intended and identify corrective action when they are not.
The historical record demonstrates that the Commission once maintained a regular process for identifying regulatory deficiencies, considering public petitions, and directing the Division to prepare regulatory changes. That practice has largely disappeared. The Coalition's petitions illustrate the consequences: identified problems affecting existing homeowner protections have yet to receive substantive consideration by the body lawmakers entrusted with rulemaking authority.
Public Comment Is Not Public Examination
The Commission's declining independent initiative is also reflected in how it engages with the public. Nevada's Open Meeting Law provides opportunities for public comment. But allowing someone to speak for three minutes is not the same as examining the problem that person has brought forward.
As described earlier, Chairman Michael Buckley recognized public participation as an important source of information for the Commission. Comments from homeowners and other stakeholders helped identify problems and inform regulatory improvements. Public participation was part of the Commission's work, not merely a procedural requirement.
Today, homeowners may identify recurring statutory ambiguities, describe enforcement failures, or question regulatory practices. Their comments may be recorded in meeting minutes, but the Commission's published agendas and minutes seldom reveal subsequent examination, direction to staff, or consideration of corrective action.
The Coalition has repeatedly raised concerns involving the Division's legal interpretations, investigative confidentiality, regulatory petitions, and recurring enforcement problems. Yet we have been unable to identify meaningful Commission examination of any of those concerns.
The Commission is not required to agree with every speaker or debate issues raised during public comment. But commissioners can identify concerns warranting examination and arrange for those subjects to be placed on a future agenda for appropriate consideration.
That is the distinction between providing an opportunity to speak and maintaining a regulatory process that learns from what the public brings to its attention.
When recurring problems are repeatedly identified but never receive substantive consideration, public participation loses most of its practical value. The Commission's authority is not limited to reacting to proposals presented by NRED. It can independently identify subjects warranting examination, request appropriate staff work, and place regulatory questions on future agendas.
That independence becomes particularly important when public concerns involve the Division's own interpretations, enforcement decisions, or administrative practices. A Commission that does not independently examine those concerns risks allowing the very administrative practices being questioned to continue without meaningful regulatory scrutiny.
The opportunity to address the Commission should be more than an opportunity to speak. It should also provide a means by which problems affecting homeowner protections can receive serious regulatory consideration.
Lawmakers Recognized the Need for Institutional Reform
Concerns about the effectiveness of Nevada's HOA regulatory institutions are not new. More than a decade ago, one of the principal architects of the system publicly questioned whether it was still protecting homeowners.
During an April 8, 2015 Senate Judiciary hearing on SB 258, former Senator Mike Schneider recalled his role in establishing the Ombudsman's office and subsequently creating the CIC Commission to strengthen homeowner protections.
Schneider acknowledged that the Commission had initially worked, but argued that its effectiveness had deteriorated following the departure of its original members. He described the Commission as having become "useless."
His testimony is particularly significant because he was not questioning whether the original regulatory system had been capable of functioning. He was describing how an institution he had helped establish had lost its effectiveness.
Schneider described homeowners repeatedly seeking assistance from the Ombudsman and other authorities without obtaining meaningful relief. A decade later, those accounts sound remarkably familiar to the Coalition, which continues to hear similar frustrations from Nevada homeowners.
During the hearing, Schneider advocated removing NRED from the process and transferring the Ombudsman to the Attorney General's Office. Senator Joyce Woodhouse, who sponsored SB 258, likewise emphasized the importance of placing the Ombudsman within an institution equipped to provide effective legal and investigative support. Former Commissioner Jonathan Friedrich described investigative delays, staff turnover, and other enforcement problems he believed justified reform.
Their testimony demonstrated substantial dissatisfaction with regulatory performance, particularly the effectiveness of the Ombudsman's investigative responsibilities. However, SB 258 encountered opposition and did not become law.
The question of the Ombudsman's institutional independence resurfaced in 2019. Senator Woodhouse introduced SB 392, again proposing to transfer the office from NRED to the Attorney General. During legislative hearings, Woodhouse explained that the proposal encountered resistance and presented a negotiated alternative retaining the Ombudsman within NRED while authorized the Director of Business and Industry to establish a Common-Interest Community Task Force to study problems affecting common-interest communities and recommend legislative or regulatory improvements.
The Ombudsman remained within NRED, and the question of institutional independence remained unresolved.
The Task Force's authorization is nonetheless significant. Lawmakers had already established a specialized Commission with authority to adopt regulations, collect information about the operation of common-interest communities, and address disciplinary matters. Yet the Legislature subsequently authorized another body to study systemic problems and recommend improvements.
The Task Force was not intended to replace the Commission or perform its existing statutory duties. Its creation nevertheless raises an important question: Why were recurring problems affecting homeowner protections not already receiving sustained examination through the institutions lawmakers had established? Schneider's testimony is instructive precisely because he acknowledged that Nevada's original regulatory institutions had worked before losing their effectiveness. His experience reinforces the importance of institutional independence, initiative, and accountability in achieving effective homeowner protection.
Nevada has already established a statutory framework and regulatory institutions intended to protect homeowners. The challenge is not necessarily to replace them, but to restore the conditions necessary for those institutions to fulfill the responsibilities lawmakers assigned them.
Restore an Independent Voice for Homeowners
The Ombudsman's office occupies a critical position in Nevada's HOA regulatory system. The Legislature established it to assist homeowners, educate association boards, help resolve disputes, and address complaints involving common-interest communities. Those responsibilities place the Ombudsman in direct contact with recurring problems involving Nevada's HOA laws. The office should therefore be an important source of information about where statutory protections are unclear, inconsistently implemented, or failing to achieve their intended purpose.
That role is not incompatible with impartiality.
Historically, Nevada Ombudsmen have participated directly in discussions about the effectiveness of HOA laws. In 2008, Ombudsman Lindsay Waite publicly acknowledged deficiencies in the existing system while explaining that her office did not take sides in individual disputes. In 2021, Ombudsman Charvez Foger testified in support of legislation addressing conflicts involving HOA management companies and collection agencies, explaining that the proposal reflected problems identified through complaints received by NRED.
These examples demonstrate that impartiality in resolving individual disputes need not prevent an Ombudsman from identifying systemic deficiencies or supporting corrective legislative action.
Regulators are not expected to be neutral about fulfilling the laws they are entrusted to administer.
Yet Nevada's Ombudsman remains administratively subordinate to NRED. The Administrator appoints the Ombudsman, and the office operates within the Division's administrative hierarchy. That arrangement creates an institutional concern when problems identified through the Ombudsman's work involve the Division's own legal interpretations, enforcement decisions, or administrative practices.
An Ombudsman responsible for assisting homeowners and identifying recurring regulatory problems should be able to report those concerns independently, including when they involve the performance of the institution within which the office operates.
The Coalition proposes restoring the Ombudsman's institutional independence—not by creating another regulatory agency or expanding government authority, but by changing to whom the Ombudsman is accountable.
One approach would be to place the office under independent legislative accountability, potentially through the Legislative Counsel Bureau. Such an arrangement would be unconventional and would require careful consideration of constitutional and organizational responsibilities. But Nevada's HOA system is itself an unusual creation of lawmakers—private associations exercising extraordinary statutory powers over homeowners and their property, often without the conventional safeguards associated with governmental authority. Lawmakers cannot simply acknowledge the quasi-governmental nature of HOAs and consider their responsibility fulfilled.
Nevada already has an example of independent governmental accountability in the LCB's Audit Division. Although the Legislative Auditor and HOA Ombudsman have different responsibilities, the underlying principle is relevant: an office charged with identifying problems should have sufficient independence from the institutions whose performance may require examination.
The unconventional nature of the proposed arrangement should not, by itself, discourage its consideration. The more important question is whether it would provide the independence and accountability needed to make Nevada's existing homeowner protections effective.
But the objective is straightforward. The Ombudsman should no longer be administratively subordinate to NRED or the Commission. Its appointment, supervision, and ability to independently identify and report systemic problems should be protected from the institutions whose actions or inaction may warrant examination.
The Ombudsman could continue to be physically housed within NRED and share administrative resources where practical. The essential difference would be to whom the Ombudsman is accountable, not where the office is located.
Preserve Existing Regulatory Responsibilities
The Coalition is not proposing new regulatory powers, another enforcement agency, or an expansion of government authority over homeowners and their associations. Nevada has already established the necessary statutory responsibilities and institutions. The proposed reforms would preserve those responsibilities while changing the lines of accountability and restoring independent judgment.
The Ombudsman would continue assisting homeowners, providing education, facilitating intervention, and identifying recurring problems involving Nevada's HOA laws. NRED investigators would continue conducting formal investigations and preparing matters for enforcement. The Division would retain its existing administrative and prosecution responsibilities. The CIC Commission would continue adjudicating disciplinary proceedings and exercising its rulemaking authority.
What must change is the independence and accountability with which those responsibilities are exercised.
The Commission must have meaningful access to information about investigative outcomes, recurring violations, and administrative practices affecting its statutory responsibilities, while preserving legitimate investigative confidentiality.
The Coalition has questioned whether interpretations of NRS 116.757 have unnecessarily restricted that access. Clarifying the law to ensure appropriate Commission oversight would strengthen the existing regulatory structure without expanding its substantive enforcement powers.
The Commission should also resume independently examining regulatory deficiencies identified by homeowners, the Ombudsman, and the Division. Restoring the Commission's former standing regulatory-review agenda would be a practical first step.
These reforms may require statutory amendments, but they do not require granting regulators new enforcement powers. Their purpose is to make existing institutions more independent, accountable, and effective.
The Legislature's Continuing Responsibility
Nevada lawmakers established a system in which private associations exercise extraordinary powers over homeowners and their property. Although organized as private legal entities, associations may impose mandatory assessments, regulate property use, levy fines, and enforce obligations through liens and foreclosure. Homeowners generally cannot negotiate the governing documents or decline association membership while retaining their property.
Those extraordinary powers create a corresponding responsibility for lawmakers to ensure that the institutions established to protect homeowners are functioning as intended.
The record examined throughout this series reveals a regulatory system that continues to perform many of its assigned activities but too often fails to translate that experience into institutional improvement.
Complaints are investigated and closed, yet recurring problems remain unexamined. Statutory ambiguities persist despite repeated requests for clarification. The Commission continues considering regulations, but the independent initiative demonstrated by its early leadership has diminished. And the Ombudsman's ability to identify and advocate for systemic improvements remains constrained by its placement within the Division.
Former Senator Schneider recognized that institutional independence mattered to effective homeowner protection. His concerns, expressed more than a decade ago, remain relevant to the challenges documented throughout this series.
Nevada does not necessarily need another regulatory institution or an entirely new set of homeowner protections. It needs its existing institutions to exercise the responsibilities lawmakers assigned them—with the independence, initiative, and accountability those responsibilities require.
Nevada lawmakers built the HOA system. They established regulatory institutions to make its extraordinary powers accountable to the homeowners subject to them.
The responsibility now is to make those institutions work as lawmakers intended.
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[1] The report is confusing as presented, and the public record provides no explanation of how to interpret the chart on page 14 of 21. For purposes of this analysis, “found” is understood to mean violations identified through NRED investigations. The percentage was calculated using four categories listed under “INTRV2 Found Issues”: NAC 116.405 (Prohibited Board Actions), NRS 116.3103 (Board Powers and Fiduciary Duties), NRS 116.31034 (Board Elections and Eligibility), and NRS 116.31083 (Executive Board Meetings). The report does not explain how the 21 investigations resulting in a Compliance Demand Letter (CDL) or Letter of Instruction (LOI) relate to these findings, nor how the 10 investigations reported as proceeding to CIC Commission hearings are reflected in the figures.
[2] Nevada Commission for Common-Interest Communities and Condominium Hotels, Information Concerning Board or Commission Subject to Review by the Sunset Subcommittee of the Legislative Commission (2016). The Commission identified four regulatory proceedings originating in 2013 and adopted in 2015: R049-13, R050-13, R052-13, and R152-13. See also the LCB 2013 Register. Official R050-13 legislative-review statement
[3] Nevada Real Estate Division, Legislative Review of Adopted Regulations, R050-13, supporting statement pursuant to NRS 233B.066, page 21. Documents the Commission's standing regulatory-review agenda, public participation, and direction to NRED at its June 11–13, 2013 meeting to prepare proposed regulatory language.
[4] Commission for Common-Interest Communities and Condominium Hotels, Decision on Petition to Repeal Regulation File No. R199-09, July 2011. The Commission identified itself as the appropriate body to consider the petition under NRS 233B.100 and denied the petition following substantive consideration.
[5] CIC Commission, Approved Meeting Minutes, February 2, 2021, agenda item 6-C, pp. 7–8. Administrator Sharath Chandra discussed NRS 233B.100, and the Commission voted to advance Cameron Clark's petition concerning NAC 116.470.
[6] Jeff Pope, "HOA Group Educating Residents," Las Vegas Sun, November 27, 2008, reporting statements by Ombudsman Lindsay Waite. Article. Nevada Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor, April 8, 2021, SB 186 hearing, p. 32, testimony of Ombudsman Charvez Foger. Official hearing minutes.
