When Ambiguity Becomes an Advantage

A call for change
Nevada's HOA laws and regulations contain an extraordinary level of ambiguity that gives developers and association boards considerable discretion, too often at the expense of homeowner protections lawmakers intended. When the meaning of a legal requirement is uncertain, those exercising authority can adopt interpretations favorable to their interests, leaving homeowners to accept those interpretations or incur substantial expense challenging them. What appears to be a minor ambiguity in the law can produce significant injustice and a profound imbalance of power in practice.
Our recent three-part series, Have Nevada's HOA Regulators Abandoned Owners?, identifies many of these ambiguities and seeks to understand why they persist. Too many owner complaints are investigated and closed, yet recurring problems remain. Too many requests for clarification go unanswered. The regulatory system continues its assigned activities, but too often fails to translate that experience into improvements.
When Uncertainty Protects Those in Authority

Consider these examples.
Competitive bidding. This should not be a difficult question. Nevada recognizes competitive bidding as an important protection when associations spend homeowner money. Yet longstanding disagreement over when competitive bidding is actually required has produced conflicting interpretations, allowing boards to treat competitive bidding—even for substantial projects—as effectively optional. Read more here.
Litigation disclosure. Nevada law requires boards to review pending litigation quarterly. But it does not clearly prescribe what meaningful information must be communicated to homeowners about lawsuits, expenses, or financial risks. Boards can argue they have complied while providing owners little information about litigation being financed with their assessments. Read more here.
Declarant control. When does developer control of an association established before 2015 actually end? Some of Nevada's largest associations have remained under developer control approaching three decades, with interpretations of the law allowing control to continue until the declarant chooses to relinquish it. That alone should raise serious questions about whether the law is working as intended. Read more here.
Board decisions by email. Boards routinely approve contracts, expenditures, and policies through potentially unlimited email communications outside formal board meetings, bypassing the transparency those meetings are intended to provide. Read more here.
Timely access to records and answers. What good is the right to inspect association records if homeowners cannot obtain documents relevant to a noticed board meeting until after directors have acted? And why should obtaining answers from one's association, about alleged improper actions, require homeowners to initiate formal complaints or litigation? Read more here and here.
These are hardly isolated or newly discovered problems. Regulators have been made aware of these concerns, yet meaningful clarification action remains elusive. The issues differ, but the recurring failure is the same: homeowners identify problems, regulators acknowledge or receive them, and the ambiguities persist.
In Have Nevada's HOA Regulators Abandoned Owners? — Part 2, we identify numerous additional unresolved questions involving elections, association governance, enforcement, records access, and homeowner protections.
Whether these ambiguities are deliberately preserved or persist through administrative failure, their consequences are not neutral. Those exercising authority benefit from uncertainty, while homeowners bear the burden and expense of challenging their interpretations.
And here is where the imbalance in influence becomes particularly consequential.
Clarifying ambiguous can restrict the discretion boards, developers, and their advisers currently enjoy. Those professional interests possess substantial resources, political influence, and established relationships with lawmakers and regulators. They are formidable participants in any effort to change existing practices.
That is precisely why Nevada established an independent regulatory framework. Its institutions should not depend on the willingness of those benefiting from existing interpretations to seek clarification.
The Political Process
Most Nevada homeowners will not be surprised by the observation that nearly all efforts to change or advance Nevada's HOA laws originate with the legal and professional community serving our associations—the attorneys, community managers, developers, and their industry lobbying organizations, including the Community Associations Institute (CAI), Nevada Association of Community Managers (NACM), and Community Association Management Executive Officers (CAMEO).

Industry influence extends beyond public hearings to established relationships with lawmakers, private discussions, organized advocacy, and financial contributions to legislative campaigns. Its concerns are heard and understood, both publicly and behind closed doors, in ways individual homeowners rarely enjoy.
There is little reason to expect the upcoming 2027 Nevada legislative session to be different. For most readers, this too will come as no surprise either.
Our political system, at both the national and state levels, has long recognized the dangers of an imbalance between organized industries and the consumers affected by their practices. Industry representatives often possess the expertise, resources, and continuing relationships necessary to influence legislation and regulation. Individual consumers generally do not.
That is one reason independent regulatory institutions were established and so important. Their responsibility is not simply to hear the industry and administer existing rules. It is to independently examine whether those rules are working as intended, including when consumers identify problems that industry representatives may have little incentive to correct.
In the case of the Nevada’s HOA industry, lawmakers recognized the need for something more than a political process dominated by them. They built a regulatory framework intended to provide continuing, independent examination of HOA governance. That is what makes that f ramework’s present shortcomings so difficult to understand—or accept.
Nevada Built a Better System
I am not an attorney. But I spent two careers in highly regulated industries—military and commercial aviation and acute-care hospitals. I am no stranger to regulations or the institutions responsible for administering them. So when I encountered firsthand the consequences of ambiguities in Nevada's HOA laws, I wanted to understand why so many remained unresolved, some for decades, particularly when their practical effects so often disadvantage homeowners.
Nevada adopted its version of the Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act (UCIOA) in 1991, drawing on a well-crafted and respected model developed by the Uniform Law Commission (ULC). But the model had what I consider a fundamental weakness. The ULC developed an administrative regulatory framework but made its adoption optional—arguably a compromise necessary to gain sufficient industry acceptance for the model legislation. Whatever the reason, states could adopt extensive HOA governance laws without establishing the independent institutions needed to effectively address disputes, oversee their operation, and respond to recurring problems or changes in association governance. For more, read: HOA primer-start to controversy.
Nevada lawmakers soon recognized that their initial reliance on civil courts to resolve ordinary HOA disputes was inadequate and disadvantaged owners. Civil courts are designed primarily to resolve legal disputes between parties presumed to have equal standing before the law and to provide remedies, including damages. Yet many HOA disagreements begin with little or no monetary consequence, involving nothing more than competing interpretations of a law or governing document—where the contesting parties have vastly unequal resources. Resorting to expensive litigation to resolve them makes little sense, certainly for individual homeowners.
Led by Senator Mike Schneider, Nevada lawmakers responded by building the most comprehensive HOA-dedicated regulatory framework in the country. The centerpiece of the 2005 reforms was the CIC Commission—not simply an administrative body to adjudicate alleged HOA violations, but an institution empowered to direct and approve regulations, provide continuing examination of an evolving system, and identify statutory problems requiring legislative correction.
That continuing responsibility was particularly important in a state whose Legislature meets for only 120 days every two years. The Commission could do what lawmakers had neither the time nor the specialized experience to do themselves: examine recurring problems, consider competing interests, and help develop informed and vetted solutions for legislative consideration.
The Commission did not create every ambiguity in Nevada's HOA laws. But it was established, in part, to identify and address problems through regulation or recommend legislative corrections when existing authority proved insufficient.
Yet just a decade after its creation in 2005, former Senator Mike Schneider, one of the principal architects of Nevada's regulatory framework, was publicly questioning its effectiveness—and even calling for the CIC Commission to be eliminated and the Ombudsman's Office and its investigative function to be relocated to the Attorney General's Office.
Think about that. One of the lawmakers most responsible for building what may be the nation's strongest HOA regulatory framework had concluded it wasn't working.
Our examination in Have Nevada's HOA Regulators Abandoned Owners? — Part 3 documents the Commission's early regulatory initiative and its subsequent decline. That history suggests the problem is not necessarily the framework lawmakers created, but the failure of those entrusted with it to exercise the independent initiative and responsibility needed to make it effective.
Schneider may have been right to call for dismantling the Commission. But before taking that extraordinary step—one lawmakers have thus far resisted—we should determine whether the failure lies in the framework itself or in how those entrusted with it have chosen to operate it.
Today, after more than three decades of experience, Nevada should have produced better results.
Nevada already has the institutions, authority, and mechanisms to identify recurring problems, clarify requirements, develop regulations, and recommend legislative corrections. And those mechanisms worked—at least initially.
The Coalition is not calling for another regulatory system. We are calling on those entrusted with the one Nevada already built to make it work.


