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Can Incumbent HOA Directors Decide Who Is Eligible to Serve?

Writer: Mike Kosor
Mike Kosor
2 hours ago
11 min read

Nevada law expressly restricts executive boards from determining directors' qualifications. Yet associations must prohibit ineligible individuals from serving. So, who has authority to determine that a statutory disqualification exists when the issue is disputed?


Disclosure: I am currently involved in litigation with my homeowners association challenging its interpretation of Nevada law, under which the incumbent board concluded that I was disqualified "by operation of law" and removed me from office 18 months into my elected term. Through my work as founder of the Nevada HOA Reform Coalition, I have since become aware of other instances in which directors were removed through unilateral board action.


This article explains the statutory basis for my disagreement, acknowledges the competing interpretation, and examines the broader implications for homeowners' election rights. The underlying legal question extends well beyond my individual dispute.

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The Issue Is Who Makes the Determination

Nevada law is clear: incumbent HOA directors are prohibited from determining the qualifications of members of their executive boards.


NRS 116.3103(2)(d) expressly states that an executive board may not:


Determine the qualifications, powers, duties or terms of office of members of the executive board.


NRS 116.31034(13) separately requires associations to exclude statutorily ineligible individuals from election ballots and prohibit them from serving.


Undisputedly an obligation exists. But for what? The duty to enforce an established disqualification is not the same as authority to determine that a disputed disqualification exists- that the statute clearly precludes.


Some association attorneys nonetheless disagree. They argue that the board's general authority to act on behalf of the association under NRS 116.3103(1), combined with the association's obligation to exclude ineligible individuals, necessarily permits incumbent directors to determine whether someone meets statutory eligibility requirements. Presumably under this interpretation, NRS 116.3103(2)(d) prevents boards from creating or changing qualifications, but not from determining whether a particular individual is disqualified under requirements already established by law.


That interpretation raises a fundamental issue: If lawmakers intended only to prohibit boards from creating or changing qualifications, why did they not use those words expressly, rather than prohibiting boards from "determining" directors' qualifications?


The distinction is consequential. An association may readily verify objective information, such as unit ownership. But determining whether an individual has a disqualifying financial interest requires resolving disputed facts and competing statutory interpretations. That is not merely routine election administration. It determines whether an elected director remains in office—or whether a homeowner opposing the incumbent board is permitted to run for election.


In cases where eligibility is contested or reasonably subject to dispute, how to obtain a timely, independent determination remains a legitimate procedural question. Potential avenues include regulatory adjudication, judicial review, independent association procedures consistent with Nevada law, and the Commission's authority to establish hearing panels within its jurisdiction. Which approaches are appropriate and whether additional procedures are needed, warrant examination by NRED and the CIC Commission. But what is clear is that such determinations may not be made by incumbent directors themselves.


Statutory Disqualification Is Not the Same as a Conflict of Interest

Consider NRS 116.31034(10)(a)(2), which, subject to statutory exceptions, prohibits board service by someone who stands to gain personal profit or compensation from a matter before the executive board. Nevada law also addresses conflicts of interest in NRS 116.31034(9) requiring candidates to disclose certain relationships and potential conflicts, while NRS 116.31085 establishes disclosure and abstention requirements.


At point, disclosure of a potential conflict of interest does not, by itself, disqualify a candidate. But as also noted, Nevada law presents a more fundamental problem. NRS 116.31084 requires directors with certain financial interests to disclose them and abstain from voting, while NRS 116.31034(10)(a)(2) appears to make those same interests grounds for disqualification.


If those interests automatically disqualify a director, the disclosure and abstention requirements lose much of their purpose. As we concluded in our earlier article, Nevada's HOA Conflict of Interest Rules Are Flawed—Reform Needed, the statutory provisions can be viewed as contradictory and need to be clarified.


In any case, determining whether someone is statutorily ineligible can involve complex factual and legal questions, not merely verifying an objective fact. For example, litigation seeking only a declaration of legal rights presents a materially different financial-interest question from litigation seeking personal monetary damages. Resolving such disputes requires interpreting the law and applying it to contested facts- precisely the type of eligibility determination NRS 116.3103(2)(d) prohibits incumbent directors from making.


Lawmakers Were Warned in 2015 —Yet the Problem Remains Unresolved

Lawmakers certainly could have demanded the drafting of the eligibility provisions more precisely, in particular, identifying who has the authority to resolve disputed disqualifications. Remarkably, that concern was raised when the Legislature considered SB 174 in 2015.


Attorney William Wright warned the Senate Judiciary Committee on February 24, 2015 that determining whether a candidate stood to gain personal profit or compensation was fact-specific, could generate litigation, and lacked a clear enforcement mechanism. He also questioned what would happen if an elected director subsequently became ineligible.


At the subsquent April 28, 2015 Assembly Judiciary hearing, Assemblyman Elliot Anderson challenged the fundamental premise of the proposed disqualification. He explained that he had voted against A.B. 238 after the provision was added by a floor amendment, questioning how anyone could determine in advance whether a prospective director might benefit from contracts or matters that had not yet arisen. He raised questions about how the proposed disqualification would be determined and enforced.


Six members of the State Bar's Common Interest Community Committee also warned in written testimony of “serious issues with adding this type of prohibition” to NRS 116. Their testimony suggests they understood the existing prohibition against personal profit or compensation in the context of identifiable financial transactions involving the association—not speculative future benefits or a homeowner's pursuit of declaratory relief through litigation. They explained that the proposed language could be interpreted to include indirect benefits shared by all homeowners. They also warned that the vague language would likely result in costly eligibility challenges.


Nevertheless, lawmakers enacted the disqualification provisions without addressing the ambiguity surrounding how disputed eligibility would be determined and enforced. Why is not clear from the record.


But what lawmakers did not do is equally significant. They did not expressly authorize incumbent boards to adjudicate disputed eligibility. They allowed the existing statutory restriction against determining directors' qualifications to stand. That omission does not conclusively establish legislative intent. But it weighs against interpreting an obligation imposed on the association as an implicit grant of authority to its incumbent board.


The obligation may also have been intended to prevent an association from allowing a favored but statutorily ineligible individual to run for or remain in office. The requirement applies regardless of whom incumbent directors support.


My interpretation gives effect to both provisions and the broader Nevada election principle discussed next: the association must enforce an established statutory disqualification, while the board remains prohibited from determining disputed qualifications.


More than a decade later, the very problems identified during the 2015 legislative hearings remain unresolved. Nevada established specialized regulatory institutions to identify and address such difficulties, yet NRED and the CIC Commission have not provided a publicly accessible, authoritative resolution of who may determine contested director eligibility. The concern is no longer simply that lawmakers failed to anticipate a problem. They were expressly warned about it. The larger question is why Nevada's regulatory institutions have allowed that problem to persist for more than ten years.


Nevada's Election Laws Reflect a Broader Principle

Those who govern should remain at arm's length from official decisions that may determine whether they—or others they support—continue to govern. Limits on incumbent control over elections have long been recognized as important safeguards in public election law.

Nevada's HOA election statutes reflect that same principle.


Nevada lawmakers recognized the importance of applying democratic principles to HOA governance. As the Legislative Counsel Bureau explained in its 2014 Policy and Program Report:


"Lawmakers felt strongly that democratic principles should apply even in private associations because such organizations directly affect individuals in their most expensive and cherished possession—their homes."


That principle is especially relevant when those already holding office claim the authority to decide who may challenge them or continue serving alongside them.


Nevada's HOA election statutes reflect that same principle. The Legislature necessarily sought to accommodated differences among associations, including their election schedules, by assigning responsibilities to the association—notably, not expressly to its incumbent executive board—and requiring election procedures to be established in association bylaws.


But it was clear in its goal to establish safeguards against improper incumbent influence. NRS 116.31034 restricts incumbent access to ballots and prohibits unreasonable interference with candidates' campaigns. NRS 116.31035 protects candidates' access to official association publications, while electronic voting is subject to independent-administration requirements.


The Legislature's treatment of good standing is particularly revealing.


NRS 116.31034(9)(b) requires candidates to disclose whether they are in good standing. But even when a candidate is not in good standing, the Legislature did not make that condition grounds for disqualification. Instead, it required disclosure to homeowners, allowing them to decide whether the information should influence their votes.


NRED expressly confirms this distinction in its official Board Candidate Nomination Form Template, page 2, stating that being out of good standing or having a perceived conflict of interest does not itself make a candidate ineligible under Chapter 116.


Significantly, the Legislature did not authorize incumbent directors to resolve a disputed good-standing determination by excluding the candidate. Determining who may appear on the ballot—or whether an elected director may remain in office—is more consequential than administering the ballots themselves. And, as previously discussed, determining the qualifications of board members is an act expressly prohibited to the executive board.


Nevada's election protections reinforce our interpretation of that prohibition as a safeguard against incumbent control over homeowners' electoral choices.


Nevada's Nonprofit Law Parallel Principle

Nevada's general nonprofit corporation law provides further support for this principle. NRS 82.296 distinguishes directors elected by members from directors appointed by others. It generally assigns removal of member-elected directors to the members entitled to elect them, while permitting directors to remove another director under subsection 2 when no members are entitled to elect directors. The statute thus reflects a broader legislative approach: removal authority generally follows the authority to elect or appoint.


This is more than a useful analogy. NRS 116.1108 expressly provides that general principles of corporate law supplement Chapter 116 except where inconsistent with it. NRS 116.11085 further establishes that Chapter 116 prevails when the two chapters conflict. Thus, where Chapter 116 leaves a genuine gap, applicable provisions of Nevada's nonprofit corporation law may help fill it.


NRS 116.31036 establishes a corresponding homeowner-controlled procedure for removing elected HOA directors. Although NRS 82.296 does not itself resolve who may adjudicate disputed statutory eligibility, these provisions reinforce the Legislature's distinction between member-elected and appointed directors—and weigh against interpreting general board powers as authority to displace an elected representative without an independent legal basis.


Neither Bylaws Nor Legal Counsel Can Supply Missing Authority

NRED's election FAQ advises associations to examine their bylaws when considering whether a board majority may remove another director. But bylaws cannot override Chapter 116. NRS 116.1104 generally prohibits varying or waiving statutory requirements unless expressly permitted. Requiring bylaws to specify the manner of removal does not, by itself, authorize incumbent directors to exercise removal powers reserved by statute to homeowners.


Nor should ordinary removal procedures be confused with statutory disqualification. NRS 116.31036 provides for removal of directors by homeowners allowing the process by which that can occur to be supplemented by governing documents. That requirement does not confer independent removal authority on incumbent boards, nor does it permit them to circumvent statutory restrictions by characterizing a removal as a determination of eligibility.


Even NRED’s investigative findings or compliance demands do not, by themselves, establish owner disqualification nor that incumbent directors possess statutory authority to adjudicate contested eligibility.


The issue remains who has authority to establish that a disputed disqualification exists. Describing the resulting vacancy as arising "by operation of law" does not itself answer who may make the contested finding. Nevada law provides independent mechanisms for addressing disputed statutory obligations. Under NRS 116.765 and NRS 116.770, formal Chapter 116 enforcement complaints are heard by the CIC Commission or a hearing panel following investigation by NRED. NRS 116.623 separately provides for declaratory orders and advisory opinions interpreting Chapter 116, while courts retain authority to resolve appropriate legal disputes.


In enforcement matters, NRED's role is investigative, not adjudicatory. Its investigative findings or compliance demands should inform owners and subsequent proceedings, but do not constitute an adjudication of contested statutory ineligibility—and certainly do not confer authority on incumbent directors to make that determination themselves.


Yes, if as previously noted, a determination was made by an appropriate authority that an owner was disqualified from serving, board action is necessary. But that action does not equate to unilaterally making the disqualification determination.


Lastly, legal counsel plays an important role in advising associations. But even if counsel correctly concludes that an owner is statutorily disqualified, that legal opinion does not confer authority the statute withholds from the board. Reliance on legal counsel does not grant incumbent directors the statutory authority to adjudicate another director's contested eligibility.


The Statutory Restriction Must Have Meaning

Nevada law grants HOA executive boards substantial authority. But that authority is not unlimited.


NRS 116.3103(2)(d) expressly prohibits executive boards from determining directors' qualifications. The Legislature did not merely prohibit boards from creating or changing those qualifications. It expressly prohibited them from determining them. Nevada courts have consistently held that statutory language must be given meaning and that interpretations rendering legislative language ineffective or superfluous should be avoided. Reading "determine" as though lawmakers had written only "create or change" requires justification, particularly when the narrower interpretation permits the very disputed eligibility determinations the statute appears to prohibit.


The interpretation presented here gives both provisions effect: an association must enforce an established statutory disqualification, but its incumbent directors cannot themselves adjudicate contested eligibility. If a court or another legally authorized decision-maker determines that an individual is ineligible, the association must comply. The duty to enforce that determination does not confer authority on incumbent directors to make it.


The 2015 legislative history demonstrates that lawmakers were warned about the difficulties of determining eligibility. Yet lawmakers did not amended the restrictions imposed by NRS 116.31034 or enacted an express grant of authority permitting incumbent boards to resolve those disputes.


Having studied Nevada's HOA laws for years as a layperson, I appreciate how difficult it can be for legislative drafters to capture every aspect of lawmakers' intentions. This is hardly the first instance in which statutory language could have been more precise, nor will it be the last. In this case, a few additional words identifying who may resolve contested eligibility could have avoided much of the disagreement. But the absence of those words does not negate the Legislature's express prohibition against executive boards determining directors' qualifications.


Nevada's broader election principles reinforce that interpretation. Lawmakers established safeguards against improper incumbent influence over homeowners' electoral choices. Allowing incumbent directors to determine who is eligible to challenge them—or to remove another elected director based on their own disputed findings—cannot be reconciled with those safeguards.


Others may seek to advance a different interpretation. But the existence of a competing interpretation does not give incumbent directors authority to adopt whichever interpretation expands their own powers. Neither their interpretation of the law nor that of their counsel can confer authority the statute withholds.


Conclusion — The Regulator's Responsibility

A regulatory institution charged with administering homeowner protections should not allow a fundamental question about who may determine owner eligibility for elected office and remove elected representatives to remain unresolved indefinitely.


Yet that is precisely the situation in Nevada. NRED is aware that association boards, acting on the advice of legal counsel, have asserted authority to unilaterally remove elected directors, determine candidate eligibility, and unilaterally exclude owners from election ballots. These assertions rest on an interpretation of Nevada law that disregards explicit statutory restrictions on board authority and the protections afforded to homeowners in electing and removing their representatives.


Remarkably, NRED's own published guidance acknowledges that the law is silent on whether a board majority may remove another director without a homeowner vote. Yet rather than explain what legal authority would permit such an action, or how that authority could be reconciled with existing statutory protections, the Division directs associations to consult their bylaws.


How can the regulator acknowledge the absence of express statutory authority, yet leave incumbent boards free to exercise that disputed power without resolving its legality? Statutory silence is not itself a grant of authority, and an association's bylaws cannot override controlling statutory restrictions.


To our knowledge, the Division has never formally adopted the interpretation advanced by these boards and their counsel. Rather than confronting that interpretation, explaining its position, or seeking legislative clarification if necessary, NRED has allowed these practices to continue without publicly resolving their legality.


In July 2025, the Nevada HOA Reform Coalition formally petitioned NRED for rulemaking expressly identifying the unresolved question of who has authority to determine disputed director eligibility. More than a year later, the Division has neither issued a substantive interpretation nor has the Commission formally considered or denied the petition.


Homeowners should not have to finance costly litigation to establish who has authority to decide whether they may run for office or continue serving after being elected. That is precisely the kind of uncertainty Nevada established a specialized regulatory system to address.

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Disclaimer: I am not an attorney. The legal interpretations and opinions expressed in this article reflect my independent research and understanding of Nevada law, including my review of the relevant statutes and legislative history. They are offered for public discussion and are not legal advice. Readers facing similar issues should consult a qualified Nevada attorney regarding their particular circumstances.

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